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INTRODUCTION
Let us offer a scenario familiar to most university faculty. A group
of academics gathers to discuss wife beating or deadbeat dads or sexual
harassment or date rape. At some point, one of the participants leans
back in his/her chair and offers the following observation: "I believe that
this phenomenon [wife beating, deadbeat dads, etc.] is a problem, and
in general I agree with most of feminism, but I just don't like all the
malebashing by feminists when these subjects come up."
This concern about feminist "malebashing" is increasingly common,
inside the university and out, but unfortunately, because of the emotions
involved, most discussions of malebashing generate more confusion than
understanding. When feminists say negative things about men, they often
speak in anger and perhaps fear. When men respond, they are often
angry, defensive, and perhaps hurt. While this confusion may be under-
standable, it is still counter-productive. The dialogue is plagued by a
failure to answer with precision or rigor the most basic questions about
this subject: What is "malebashing," i.e., illegitimate negative statements
about men, and how is it different from legitimate negative statements
about men? Are feminists in general or feminists of some particular kind
necessarily committed to malebashing because of the assumptions of their
own positions?
This Article will attempt to address these questions, to consider the
justifiability of negative statements about men within feminism. It is not,
however, about the justifiability of feminism itself. We assume the
general themes of feminism: women deserve equal status, rights, and
opportunities; political activism may legitimately seek to advance the
interests of women; and legal reform is one legitimate path to improve
the lot of women. We do not mean to respond to global criticisms of the
feminist project as a whole. We assess only the use, or abuse, of a
particular rhetorical strategy within that project.
We will also offer a definition of malebashing only for a particular
context-an academic dialogue. Sensitivity to malebashing extends
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throughout contemporary society-in the popular press, in casual
conversation, on television, in political campaigning. Malebashing and
accusations of malebashing within the academic press are therefore part
of a broad social dynamic, and cultural trends within the university do
not exist in isolation. Nonetheless, we wish to focus on the academic
dialogue for the following reasons. First, different fora of social interac-
tion serve different functions and therefore have different internal ethoi.
Many speecfi acts that would be appropriate in a public debate, for
example, would not be appropriate at a funeral. As a result, any analysis
of malebashing must be forum-specific. Second, the academic dialogue
is one of the fora that we know best, and so we feel more confident
analyzing its ethos as applied to malebashing. Third, as we will argue
below, the academic dialogue is structured, self-conscious, and relatively
formal; its maintenance correlatively depends on the self-conscious and
formal observation of structured norms. As a result, it is possible to
formulate more precise ideas about the nature of malebashing within the
academy than might be possible in less structured arenas like politics and
the popular media. We also hope and believe that participants in an
academic dialogue are more likely to honor such norms than actors in
other fora.
Feminist arguments appear in many fora other than the academy,
and different definitions of malebashing may be necessary for those
different fora. For example, some fora are limited to women. The
purpose of these fora may not involve dialogue across gender differences
at all; instead they may serve principally to find common ground among
women, to engage in perspectival truth-telling, to vent frustration or
anger, and so on. Many statements that would be malebashing in the
academic press might not be malebashing in these settings. Our defini-
tion of malebashing will be applicable outside the university dialogue,
therefore, but only to the extent that the purposes and values of those
fora resemble the university dialogue as we here analyze it.
We will proceed in four sections. In Section One of the Article, we
suggest some of the limits of the current dialogue, popular and academic,
regarding feminist malebashing. Section Two considers some definitions
of malebashing proposed by male commentators. In particular, some
argue that any and all negative statements about men are malebashing
because they create hostility. We reject this definition because it would
entirely foreclose any possibility of reform or even simple justice. If we
can never characterize the behavior of any men negatively, we can never
change the oppressive behavior of some men. Some commentators,
1996]
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however, would characterize malebashing in a more specific way. These
writers object principally to two specific images of men: the idea that all
men consciously conspire to oppress women, and the idea that all men
are brutes by virtue of their social or biological nature. These two
images, in our view, might form the basis for a theory of malebashing.
In Section Three, we offer a preliminary definition of "malebashing" for
the academic dialogue. Finally, Section Four argues that malebashing,
thus defined, is not required by any of the types of feminist theory
current in the legal literature.
SECTION ONE: THE DIALOGIC PROBLEM
In this Section, we consider some of the deficiencies in the present
discussion of malebashing: much of the debate is characterized by
stridency and distortion on the part of defensive males and irritated
silence on the part of dismissive feminists. This failure of customary
discourse norms blocks careful and balanced analysis of the justifiability
of malebashing within feminism. The purpose of this Section is not to
offer an exhaustive analysis of the substance of the debate. Instead, we
mean only to offer the reader a sense of the acrimonious flavor of the
debate, of the corresponding need for improvement, and of the particular
failures that need to be remedied.
To that end, this Section considers accusations of malebashing made
both in the popular press and the academic press, even though we
ultimately propose a set of norms only for the latter. We extend our
focus in this way for several reasons. First, concern about malebashing is
a society-wide issue, arguably part of the general backlash against femi-
nism.1 Thus, the academic dialogue is part of and legitimates the larger
discussion of malebashing. Accordingly, it is important to understand the
academic discourse as situated within a more popular discourse. Second,
the failure of discourse norms in this area is not limited to academia. It
is important to understand that academics feel the same emotions and
respond in some of the same ways as everyone else. Third, as we explain
below, there has been much more discussion in the popular literature.
Indeed, we had some difficulty finding any serious work in the law
journals. That difficulty surprised us, because we have observed over the
last ten years that anger at perceived malebashing is endemic in the legal
1. See SusAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINsT AMERICAN WOMEN
(1991).
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academy. Its presence may be shadowy and still relatively quiet, but it is
nonetheless very significant as an undercurrent in analyses of feminist
work, decisions on appointments of feminists, consideration of feminist
proposals like sexual harassment policies, and other matters. As long as
this resentment of perceived malebashing does not come out into the
light, however, we cannot directly address it.
A. The Accusations
The following accusation of malebashing starkly illustrates the
failures of the debate:
Attention, men of the Caucasoid persuasion. Have you made
a terrible mistake by being born white males? ... What is
going on here? Simple. Like guerrillas moving down from the
hills to attack the cities, the race-and-gender people are no
longer just sniping from marginal positions on campus and in
the art world. With the aid of an ever-credulous press corps,
they are now pumping their doctrine into the general culture.
That doctrine is that America will increasingly be divided by
a truculent tribalism, with nonwhites and white women gang-
ing up in a grand alliance to wrest power from white males.2
This passage exhibits the following features that block sensible discussion.
First, it is stridently defensive: the barbarians are coming down out of
the hills to "gang up" on us, the defenders of Roman civilization, in the
name of "truculent tribalism." Second, the passage fails to cite any living,
breathing, writing feminist to substantiate these allegations. Accordingly,
the author fails to consider what real feminists actually say. Instead, he
relies on harsh caricature. Third, he takes the most extreme position that
only a very few radical feminists might advocate (a belief in a "truculent
tribalism") and ascribes it to the whole of feminism ("the race-and-
gender people"). Finally, he fails to consider why some feminists say
negative things about men and whether those negative statements might
be justified. Instead, he roundly asserts: "It's really indefensible. It's
wrong to attack or fire people because of race and gender, even if they
happen to be white guys." 3 At this point, all of the foregoing distortion
2. John Leo, The Demonizing of White Men, U.S. NEws & WoRD REp., Apr. 26, 1993,
at 24.
3. Leo, supra note 2, at 24.
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comes home to roost: the author insists that feminists are attacking
"white guys" simply because they are male and white.4 Any consideration
of the reasons feminists give for saying negative things about men as a
class is lost in the shuffle. The author deals only with a cartoon cutout
of a feminist, rather than an actual argument.
While one might expect no better of the popular press, even
journals with higher intellectual aspirations publish work that suffers
from many of the same problems. Nicholas Davidson, a well-known
critic of feminism, opines in the journal Society that malebashing-he
calls it "female chauvinism"5-is inevitable in all forms of feminism.6 He
begins by recognizing that liberal feminism rests on the claim that there
is no essential difference between men and women. He calls this idea
"unisexism" and acknowledges that it does not on its face bash males. 7
But then he makes this startling leap of logic:
The original definition [of feminism] described feminism as
'the theory that women should have political, economic, and
social rights equal to those of men.' This theory presumes that
women do not, in fact, have rights equal to men .... If
women do not have rights equal to men, the inescapable
conclusion, which no feminist will dispute, is that women are
oppressed.... From the perception that women are oppressed
follows the perception that men are the oppressors. Society is
held to be dominated by men for their selfish benefit. Note
that the 'oppressed' and the 'oppressor' are moral catego-
ries-the oppressed are victims who have done nothing to
deserve their fate, the oppressors are villains who have done
nothing to deserve their privilege. The theory that women lack
equal rights inexorably generates the proposition that women
are oppressed and men are oppressors .... Reduced to simplest
terms, this sets up the following equation: women good, men
4. The author's only other reason to avoid malebashing is the danger of backfire. He
darkly warns that "white guys" apparently do still hold all of the power and might
use it: "At a time of high racial tensions and high immigration, it is distinctly unwise
to keep telling native-born whites that nonwhites and immigrants are a unified bloc
that's about to take over.... Does anybody remember the David Duke scare?" Leo,
supra note 2, at 24.
5. Nicholas Davidson, Feminism and Semal Harassment, SociaTy, May/June 1991, at
39, 40.
6. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 39-41.
7. Davidson, supra note 5, at 39-40.
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bad-hence women are better than men. Unisexism thus
generates female chauvinism, despite the evident contradiction
between these two points of view.'
Again, Davidson cites no actual feminists to substantiate this
tortured argument. Instead, he relies on logical derivation. He begins
with the uncontroversial proposition that feminists, by definition, believe
in equal rights for women.9 From this simple idea, he purports to
logically derive his conclusion that all feminists believe all men are
villains and all women innocent victims.10 Unfortunately, none of his
logical steps follow from the premise. Attention to the actual writing of
real feminists might have saved him from his logical errors.
Davidson's first step is to say that feminists who believe women
should have equal rights necessarily believe they do not presently have
equal rights." That conclusion does not follow from the premise: one
could believe that women do have equal rights, and they should have
those rights. To be sure, many feminists do not believe women presently
have equal rights, but perhaps some feminists do. 2 Therefore, it is not
the case that all feminists must follow Davidson even to this first step.
Davidson next argues that if one believes that women do not have
equal rights, then one must also believe they are oppressed and men are
their oppressors.' 3 Not only that-here the claims start to come thick
and fast-women are not at all responsible for the present state of affairs
and men are entirely responsible. Further, women (presumably all
women, since they all lack equal rights) are victims, and men (presum-
ably all men, since they all have superior standing) are villains.' In short,
"women good, men bad." At this point, most feminists have already left
the train at an earlier stop; Davidson is travelling alone with only a
minute subset of feminists and mistakenly concluding that they represent
all of feminism. Presumably he made that mistake because he never asked
for any of the passengers' names or their views.
8. Davidson, supra note 5, at 40-41.
9. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 39. It is worth noting that he got this definition from
Webster's Dictionary, not from any feminist writing.
10. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 41.
11. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 40.
12. At a minimum, it seems likely that some feminists believe that women have equal
rights in certain areas. For example, some feminists may believe that women have an
equal right to vote. Women's votes are not diluted compared to men's, nor are
women systematically harassed to keep them from exercising their right.
13. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 40-41.
14. See Davidson, supra note 5, at 41.
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Perhaps the overwhelming majority of feminists agree that some
men have acted in ways that oppress some women, to sustain the system
of unequal rights. But that limited conclusion does not drag us by force
of logic to accept "women good, men bad." First, consistent with their
fundamental commitment to equality, feminists may believe that sexism
is a system of role socialization that oppresses us all. Under this view,
men are victims along with women, even though they may wield more
power and disproportionately support the system of unequal rights.'5
Others may believe that men bear some responsibility but role socializa-
tion offers a partial moral excuse.16 Still others may believe that some
men are oppressive villains, but they oppress both men (especially gay
men and men of color) and women. Still others believe that some or
perhaps all women have internalized some or most of the sexism in their
society, and so they are complicit in the system of gender hierarchy. 7
Other feminists may believe all or some combination of the above, and
still others may not be sure what they think. Of course, some feminists
may also adopt the view that Davidson ascribes to them, but to tell, one
would need to consult their writings, rather than relying on caricature.
In short, the issue of moral responsibility for the present state of affairs
may be enormously complex for feminists.
We have discovered only two law review articles about malebashing.
Unhappily, both suffer-although to very different extents-from some
of the same problems. The central thesis of Brian Bendig's article, Images
of Men in Feminist Legal Theory,"8 is "that andric imagery [images of
men, male, and masculine] is an important resource in feminist legal
theory. ... ""To support this fairly uncontroversial claim, he analyzes
the work of six feminists for over sixty pages, complete with quotation
and citation, to demonstrate that they do in fact rest on images of men.2 0
While we would disagree with many of his interpretations, this section
of his article exhibits none of the general vices endemic to discussions of
malebashing. Bendig does not adopt a particularly defensive tone; he has
actually read the works of a number of feminists and takes their argu-
15. See, e.g., infia Section IVA.
16. See, e.g., infra Section IV.A
17. See, e.g., infra Section IVA. and C.
18. Brian Bendig, Images of Men in Feminist Legal Theory, 20 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 991
(1993). In some ways, it is unfair to lump Brian Bendig's article in with the other
piece in this section, because it is so different in tone and style.
19. Bendig, supra note 18, at 991.
20. See Bendig, supra note 18, at 991-1052.
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ments seriously; he ascribes the various writers' views to no one but
themselves. He is, in short, not tilting at a caricature.
To argue that feminists use images of men in their writings, how-
ever, is not an earth-shattering discovery. The real question remains: are
those (largely negative) images warranted? In the last two paragraphs of
the work, Bendig summarily concludes that the answer is no:
One is struck by the sheer volume of facile and derogatory
definitions and characterizations of men, male, and masculine,
etc., in feminist jurisprudence. Men are rarely differentiated at
all. One is also struck by the indirectness and obtuseness of
much of this imagery.... Rather than merely providing the
possibility of a salutary balance, perhaps this phenomenon has
further cluttered the confusion and heightened the crudity of
political discourse.2 '
The article ends with this statement, but that is where the discussion
should begin. One would like to ask Bendig why he concludes that these
characterizations are "facile"? Also, if men are "rarely differentiated," is
that because feminists believe that men are all the same or because they
are relying on a generalization? If the latter, is the use of that generaliza-
tion unjustifiable, unwise, or pernicious? If so, why and according to
what dialogic norms?
In contrast to Bendig's generally careful if truncated piece, Kenneth
Lasson's work Feminism Awry: Excesses in the Pursuit of Rights and
Trifles,22 is an angry screed. This work is the only extended treatment of
malebashing we have found in the legal literature. The publication of the
article was, therefore, a significant event in illuminating the distorted
dynamics of the academic debate on this subject. As we have suggested
above, legal academics do talk about malebashing, even if they do not
write about it. Indeed, Lasson himself asserts that more than one of his
colleagues fear to talk publicly on the subject because of the anticipated
reaction in the academy.23 For whatever reason, the existing dialogue goes
on at an informal, casual, and subterranean level without being exposed
to the light and discipline of public inspection. When that discussion
finally did surface in Lasson's piece, it exhibited all of the vices of the
21. Bendig, supra note 18, at 1052.
22. Kenneth Lasson, Feminism Awry: Excesses in the Pursuit of Rights and Trifles, 42 J.
LEA. EDUC. 1 (1992).
23. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 5 n.16.
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popular discussion of malebashing. Moreover, because of its excesses, the
article caused widespread anger among legal feminists, as did the decision
of the Journal of Legal Education to publish such vitriol. We remember
a general sentiment that a feminist ought to respond to Professor Lasson,
yet no one did.24 Because we think that Lasson's piece is evidence of a
more general problem, we wish to offer a careful consideration of this
article here.
Lasson begins by asserting his basic sympathy for some feminists. In
particular, he admires the way "liberal and conservative feminists ...
have improved the quality of life for many women in a number of
noteworthy ways."25 Radical feminism has, however, gone "[a]wry."26
From this point, Lasson's argument becomes difficult to summarize
because in his view, feminism has gone wrong in many ways, and the
rest of the piece piles them up without clearly distinguishing them. Two
objections, however, stand out. First, radical feminists write poorly. 21
Second, radical feminists tyrannize people,28 and they particularly hate
men.2 9 Lasson observes, "[i]any women have thus come to see the
feminist movement as antimale . "..."30 He approvingly quotes Phyllis
Schlafly on "the feminist agenda-'They hate men and they're out to
destroy any man who stands in their way."'' He concludes with an
admonition: "[Radical feminist legal scholars] should seek to persuade
with clarity and concision, telling men why a certain type of new order
(not one in which women smash men's faces in) will be good for them
as well."32
24. John Siliciano responded, but his is not a feminist analysis. See John A. Siliciano,
Fighting With Angry Women: A Response to Lasson, 42 J. LEGAL EDUC. 461 (1992).
Catharine MacKinnon wrote a letter to the editor in response, but the purpose of the
letter was to defend herself against Lasson's more scurrilous charges, not to analyze
the article as a whole. See Catharine MacKinnon, Letter to the Editor, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 465 (1992).
25. Lasson, supra note 22, at 2. Actually, it is not at all clear that Lasson is basically in
sympathy with any variety of feminism. At one point, he quotes Phyllis Schlafly
approvingly: "'The feminist movement has not improved women's lot, [and] the polls
reflect the fact. The fact that the majority of women do not want to identify with
feminists I think is obvious.'" Lasson, supra note 22, at 4 n.12 (alteration in original).
26. Lasson, supra note 22, at 1.
27. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 23-26.
28. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 2-6.
29. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 4, 14.
30. Lasson, supra note 22, at 4.
31. Lasson, supra note 22, at 14 (quoting A.M. Chaplin, Where Now Feminism!, BALTI-
MOME SUN MAG., Dec. 8, 1991, at 12).
32. Lasson, supra note 22, at 28.
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The most striking quality of this piece is its stridently defensive
tone. Lasson himself repeatedly calls attention to this defensiveness. In
his biographical footnote, he states that he "is likely to be re-cast as
curmudgeon or cur."33 Indeed, the piece was "originally penned under
a pseudonym."34 Later, he foretells that feminists will dismiss his article
"as reflecting the misguided misogyny of a society dominated by male
chauvinists." 35 Out of fear or chivalry, no one has yet spoken up to
denounce the feminist monster,36 but Kenneth Lasson is a brave man.
With the admiring support of his female research assistant-who urges
him to go further in his denunciation of feminism37--he forays out to
do battle: "So be it. The time is past due for an intellectually responsible
challenge to the radical feminists who have assumed command of the
Ivory Tower and the world beyond to which it beckons."
38
This defensiveness manifests itself in less overt ways as well. After
derogating feminist scholarship (without citation to a single feminist) as
"predominantly ad hominem,"39 he proceeds to launch a series of highly
personal attacks on prominent feminists. For example, he writes: "For
reasons of confidentiality, I cannot name the psychologist who (on
reading the quoted passage [by Catharine MacKinnon]) delivered his
opinion that its author 'needs cognitive therapy." 0 At another point, he
derides Naomi Wolf, author of The Beauty Myth: How Images of Beauty
Are Used Against Women: 1 "Her thesis may be complicated by her own
publicity tours, where she appears to be an attractive woman who does
not disdain fashionable clothes, jewelry, or makeup." 42
33. Lasson, supra note 22, at 1 (biographical footnote).
34. Lasson, supra note 22, at 1 (biographical footnote).
35. Lasson, supra note 22, at 6.
36. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 5 n.16.
37. For example, she urged him to publish this article under his own name. Lasson, supra
note 22, at 1. She also rejects Lasson's view that liberal feminism has improved
women's lot: "'Have feminists been spinning their wheels for the last 70 or 80 years,'
she asks, 'or what? One Supreme Court justice, a few heads of state, and lots of
female law students don't seem like much of an accomplishment compared with what
was done [earlier]."' Lasson, supra note 22, at 2 n.3 (alteration in original).
38. Lasson, supra note 22, at 6.
39. Lasson, supra note 22, at 7.
40. Lasson, supra note 22, at 26 n.110.
41. NAOMI WOLF, THE BAtArI M=vN: How IMAGEs OF BEAUTY ARE USED AGAINST
WOMEN (1991).
42. Lasson, supra note 22, at 19 n.77 (citing a newspaper article with the remarkable
title, This Pinup Drives Eggheads Wild, by M.G. Lord, NEWSDAY, Oct. 6, 1991, at
36). In addition to this personal attack on Wolf, he launches a similar attack on
19961
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Lasson's prose style is also defensively belligerent. He calls the
writings of radical feminists "petty mewlings of pouty prima donnas who
are intellectually dishonest to boot."43 He cites with approval those who
have called radical feminism "'a travesty of the intellect,"' 4 "'bald
ignorance,"'45 and "'pop fascism."'46 He closes with a command to
feminists: "Get a life."47
Lasson also exhibits the second dialogic vice: although he quotes
from feminists throughout this work, he fails to substantiate a number
of crucial and controversial claims about feminism. For example, he
asserts that according to cultural feminists, "[d]ifferences between men
and women ... are profound and immutable," and women have "a
truer, more caring nature."48 In support, he offers a list of "illustrative
titles," none of which remotely suggest that differences between men and
women are "immutable" or absolute.4 9 Indeed, most of the works listed
argue that men can and should come to share more in women's stereo-
typical virtues and vice-versa.50 Similarly, he asserts that according to
Gloria Steinem because she "now admits that she has long had serious problems with
the way she looks and suggests that she has always wanted to feel attractive." Lasson,
supra note 22, at 19 n.77. In case any reader has missed the obvious problem with
this line of argument, it is entirely possible to find oppressive the ways images of
beauty are used against women, and still (1) find oneself conditioned to respond to
that oppression or (2) transcend that conditioning and still want to look attractive.
43. Lasson, supra note 22, at 5.
44. Lasson, supra note 22, at 6 (quoting Brigitte Berger, Academic Feminism and the
'eft, "AcAD. QUESTIONS, Spring 1988, at 9, 10, 15).
45. Lasson, supra note 22, at 6 (quoting Maureen Mullarkey, Mullarkey Replies, THE
NATION, Aug. 1/8, 1987, at 93).
46. Lasson, supra note 22, at 6 (quoting Mullarkey, supra note 45, at 93).
47. Lasson, supra note 22, at 29. These are just a few choice selections; the article goes
on and on in much this vein.
48. Lasson, supra note 22, at 12.
49. Lasson, supra note 22, at 12 n.50. The three titles are CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFER-
ENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY IN WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT (1982); MARY
FIELD BELENKY ET AL., WOMEN'S WAYS OF KNOWING: THE DEVELOPMENT OF SELF,
VOICE, AND MIND (1986); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Difrent Voice:
Speculations on a Woman's Lauyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S LJ. 39 (1985).
50. See GILLIGAN, supra note 49, at 100, 164-74; BELENKY ET AL., supra note 49, at
176-89. The third writer, Carrie Menkel-Meadow, declines to speculate about the
origin of gender differences, see Menkel-Meadow, supra note 49, at 41-42, but she
concedes that they might disappear in a world free of gender domination. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 49, at 63.
The only cultural feminist from which Lasson quotes actual language is Robin
West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1 (1988) [hereinafter West,
Jurisprudence and Gender]. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 13. The remainder appear
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radical feminists, "[t]he differences between men and women [i.e., men
oppress women but not the reverse] are not just biological ... but
diabolical as well, '51 without citing a single feminist for the quite con-
troversial proposition that male oppressiveness is rooted in biology.
These misdescriptions affect Lasson's portrait of feminist motives for
making negative statements about men. In Lasson's view, feminists are
just angry at men for their evil, biological nature, about which men can
do nothing.52 As a result, feminism becomes nothing more than heated,
pointless, "man-hating" denunciations. Again, these are only cartoon
feminists, unsupported by citation. In fact, many and probably most
feminists believe that patriarchal culture, not biology, creates bad men.
53
Indeed, the whole purpose of much feminist analysis is to change the
culture so as to produce good men. Moreover, most feminists are careful
to note that their analysis does not apply to all men. 51 In short, men are
not inherently wicked according to most feminists. So rendered, femi-
nism would be a harder target for Lasson: he would have to approach
feminists as social reformers who say some negative things about some
men in order to get them to change, rather than as a group of harridans
who simply want to condemn men wholesale.
only as titles, as if one only needed to read the tides to know what they say. See titles
listed supra note 49.
51. Lasson, supra note 22, at 13.
52. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 13.
53. Those famous radicals, and alleged malebashers, Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea
Dworkin, for example, have both suggested that such impulses are social, not natural.
SeeANDREA DwomN, INTERCOURSE 139 (1987); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire
and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 46, 52 (1987). MacKinnon explains: "The
analysis of sex is social, not biological .... it is to refer to the standpoint from
which these acts I have documented are done. By male, then, I refer to apologists for
these data." MAcKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra, at 46,
52. In writing of Joan of Arc, Dworkin seems to ascribe responsibility to sex role
socialization, not biology: "[She] is an emblem of possibility and potentiality
consistently forbidden, obliterated, or denied by the rigid tyranny of sex-role
imperatives or the outright humiliation of second-class citizenship." DWOmIN, supra,
at 84.
54. Neither MacKinnon nor Dworkin, for example, suggests that her analysis applies to
all men. See DwoRMN, supra note 53, at 66 ("Most women are not distinct, private
individuals to most men . . . ."); DwoWaUN, supra note 53, at 64 ("In this view,
which is the predominant one, maleness is aggressive and violent ....");
MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 46,
52-56 (explaining that maleness is not a biological reality but a social construct to
which not all men belong); MACKINNON, On Exceptionality, in FEMINISM UNMODI-
FIED, supra note 53, at 70, 73 (again explaining that maleness is a social construct,
not a biological reality).
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Lasson's misdescription of feminism leads to his final failure. He
neglects to consider whether feminists' negative statements about men are
justified. Instead, he casts them as shrill, man-hating gender bigots. They
are malebashers and so one need not take them seriously. For example,
he finishes his exposition of cultural feminism with the following one
sentence paragraph: "In other words, women are nurturing and altruistic,
men individualistic and (it may be inferred) insensitive." 55 This sentence
is his whole indictment of cultural feminism. He apparently believes the
accusation of malebashing has made his argument for him: they are
saying bad things about men; they are malebashers; they must be wrong.
In fact, the analysis must start with the question of whether cultural
feminists are wrong that the culture generally makes men more individu-
alistic and insensitive. If they are right, should we not think about
reforming the culture so that both men and women can experience a full
range of human emotions?
Lasson also derides the radical feminist notion that men as a class
use power to oppress women as a class, without seriously addressing the
argument. He insists that the argument "disregards the power women
have over men concerning sex."56 For evidence of women's present power
over sex, he refers the reader to footnote one of the article, which in turn
refers only to the Myth of Lysistrata.57 He also observes, "women may
actually enjoy making love.""s This time, the citation is to some more
mythology, one modern survey, and two commentators.59 However,
Lasson never seriously addresses MacKinnon's central argument that
women have been conditioned to enjoy sex even under oppressive
conditions. That argument may have problems, but one must at least
consider its justifiability.'0 Next, Lasson observes that radical feminists
55. Lasson, supra note 22, at 13.
56. Lasson, supra note 22, at 14.
57. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 14 n.58, 1 n.1.
58. Lasson, supra note 22, at 14.
59. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 14 n.59.
60. Lasson does note that MacKinnon makes this argument, and he responds by referring
to Robin West: "[T]he argument that the sex act is a form of submission 'fails to
capture the phenomenological experience of intercourse as one of positive intimacy
... not invasive bondage.'" Lasson, supra note 22, at 15 n.59 (citing West, Jurispru-
dence and Gender, supra note 50, at 46 (alteration in original)). But MacKinnon has
argued that women have also learned to experience submission as central to women's
experience of their sexuality. See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE 130 (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF
THE STATE].
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claim that sexual assault is very common.61 For that reason, they believe,
unlike liberal feminists, that women should get special legal protection,
and they believe, unlike the cultural feminists, that "the differences that
exist between the sexes are not to be celebrated, but deplored." 62 Why
are all these claims wrong? According to Lasson, "[r]adical feminists thus
align themselves with lesbian-rights groups, which likewise attack the
notion of a male's right of access to women (and ultimately a rite of
passage and conquest)."'63 The problem with radical feminists, in other
words, is that they are really (or are really like) those man-hating lesbi-
ans. No further analysis is necessary.
When Lasson finally does consider the substance of MacKinnon's
analysis, he offers only rhetorical questions:
How does one go about proving the negative, that most men
do not oppress most women? How does one illustrate the
likelihood that most men fully understand the horror of rape
and abhor, for that matter, any aggressively violent behavior
against another human being, whether within marriage or not?
How does one refute the equation of marriage and prostitu-
tion, other than to assert that the experience of all those
couples whose marriages are reasonably happy dictates the
absurdity of that idea?6"
By the tone of these questions, Lasson apparently wants us to conclude
that one cannot prove any of these claims. Yet paradoxically, in the very
same words, he apparently means to insist on their truth, that most men
do not oppress most women, that most men abhor rape. He is, in short,
committing the sin of which he accuses MacKinnon:65 if she assumes
general oppression without good evidence, he assumes general absence of
oppression without good evidence.
If we consider his questions as real rather than rhetorical, however,
Lasson's queries might be the right ones. Do men oppress women? How
many? Do men abhor rape? How many? What implications for social '
policy ought we to derive from the answers to those questions? We must
consider these questions seriously and earnestly, not with dismissive
61. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 15-16.
62. Lasson, supra note 22, at 16.
63. Lasson, supra note 22, at 16.
64. Lasson, supra note 22, at 18.
65. See Lasson, supra note 22, at 18-19.
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ridicule. We need a responsible dialogue about the justifiability of
negative claims about men by feminists, not a jeremiad against carica-
tured manhaters.
B. The Feminist Response
The typical feminist response to accusations of malebashing has been
to ignore them. The reasons for this silence are not hard to guess. First,
as described above, many of the allegations are so angry and unbalanced
as not to merit a response. Second, these cries of malebashing come
suspiciously, "just when women and minority groups are beginning to
make some gains."" As one feminist notes, "'It almost sounds like a kind
of attempt to bring the attention back where it has been-on masculine
kinds of concerns."' 67 Finally, compared to other issues facing feminists,
the hurt feelings of those who feel bashed may seem unimportant:
"'What do men want?' women wonder with exasperation. 'They already
have everything."' 6
8
To ignore the complaints of malebashing entirely, however, is
unwise for several reasons. First, while many of these allegations may not
merit attention, they have received it. "Feminist malebashing" has
become a standard topic in the popular press in recent years.6 9 Once
66. Francine Dube, Man-bashing: Even the Good Guys Have Stopped Laughing, OTTAWA
CITIZEN, Dec. 4, 1993, at Al.
67. Dube, supra note 66, at Al (quoting Christine Overall, Philosophy Department,
Queens University).
68. Andrea Stuart, Saving the Male, NEW STATESMAN & Soc'Y, Mar. 20, 1992, at 39.
69. See, e.g., Playthell Benjamin, White Boy Blues, SUNDAY TIMES, Apr. 4, 1993, at 9-2;
Bob Berkowitz, Why TVLikes Bad Guys, PLAYBOY, Nov. 1993, at 38; Joe Bob Briggs,
The Mutant Offipring of Thelma and Louise, PLAYBOY, Feb. 1994, at 35; Neil
Chethik, Male-Bashing: New Twist on Old Garbage, THE PLAIN DEALER, Oct. 24,
1993, at 6H; David Cohen, What a Man's Got to Do, Naw STATESMAN AND SOC'Y,
June 8, 1990, at 30; Dube, supra note 66; Dennis Duggan, Is Your Wife a Buttered
Woman?, NEwsDAY, Oct. 17, 1993, Fanfare Section at 43; Jack Kammer, On Balance:
The Journalism of Gender, QUILL, May 1992, at 28; Leo, supra note 2; Ron Miller,
Female Sexism Runs Rampant on Sitcoms, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 15, 1993, at El;
Lance Morrow, Men: Are They Really That Bad?, TIME, Feb. 14, 1994, at 53; Ellen
Frankel Paul, Silly Men, Banal Men, SocIETY, Sepr./Oct. 1993, at 36; Alvin F.
Poussaint, Enough Already! Stop the Male-Bashing and Infighting, EBONY, Feb. 1993,
at 86; Harry Stein, Tube Boobs, MEN's Hu.mT, Mar. 1994, at 30; Stuart, supra note
68; Fred Tasker, Man-o-pause or Male Bashing?, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, May 1, 1994,
Lifestyle Section at 15.
Somewhat less commonly, allegations of malebashing have appeared in academic
journals as well. See, e.g., Bendig, supra note 18; Davidson, supra note 5; Richard B.
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upon a time, it may have been possible to ignore the charges and hope
they would go away, but no longer. Continued silence will only allow
the chorus to grow louder. Therefore, it behooves feminists to respond,
so as to correct misimpressions and air the contrary argument. Second,
while many basically feminist men may not share the antifeminist venom
of Davidson or Lasson, they may nonetheless feel uncomfortable with
what they perceive to be some antimale tendencies within feminism.
These men are feminism's natural allies, and it would be unfortunate to
lose them through failure to respond to the allegations. Third, while
some accusations may be groundless, it does not follow that there is no
such thing as malebashing or that feminists never engage in it.
The charge of man-hating has dogged feminism from its inception,
usually as a way to attack feminism root and branch. We wish to offer
instead a sympathetic critique of feminist malebashing from within basic
feminist norms. Given that women should be equal to men, that oppres-
sion of women has occurred and should stop, and that law and political
activism are appropriate routes to that end, we can still ask: what
statements about men, if any, should be considered "malebashing"?
SECTION Two: PROPOSED DEFINITIONS OF MALEBASHING
Accusations that feminists engage in malebashing are very common.
Exact definitions of "malebashing" are much less common. Nonetheless,
it is possible to discern three definitions proposed by those making the
allegations. First, for some, "malebashing" refers to any negative state-
ment about men that is likely to stir rancor-that is to say, any negative
statement about men, period. Second, "malebashing" refers to the view
that men by their nature are beasts. Third, "malebashing" refers to the
belief that men are engaged in a self-conscious and (nearly) universal
conspiracy to oppress women. The first definition is so broad as to block
all reform or even inquiry, but the other two may offer the basis for a
theory of malebashing in academic discourse.
Felson & Stephen R. Felson, Predicaments of Men and Women, Sociary, Sept./Oct.
1993, at 16; Lasson, supra note 22; Warren Shibles, Radical Feminism, Humanism
and Women's Studies 14 INNOVATIVE HIGHER EDUC. 35 (1989).
70. Such a response may be particularly important in light of the often highly personal
nature of the attacks. Accusations of malebashing sometimes suggest that feminists
should be dismissed because they are flawed people rather than because of any flaw
in their arguments. This "ad femina" attack can warp any attempt at substantive
debate. We are grateful to Lauren Robel for pointing out this additional reason for
response.
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Again, although our proposal is limited to the academic context, we
consider in this Section definitions of malebashing that appear in a
variety of venues. The different fora offer strikingly similar conceptions
of malebashing. This commonality indicates that concern about
malebashing is a society-wide problem and should be apprehended as
such. Irritation at alleged malebashing is not just a product of overly
sensitive academic temperaments, nor on the other hand are detached
professors immune from visceral anger on the subject. It is precisely
because accusations of malebashing are so widespread that we think it
important to address them.
A. Ending the Blame Game
A number of prominent commentators argue that men and women
should simply stop saying negative things about each other.7 ' In this
view, all negative statements about men count as malebashing. Negative
statements get in the way of cross-gender dialogue and affection. They
unnecessarily create animosity; they roil the waters of heterosexual
serenity. It is time now to lay down our weapons, love each other again,
accept that sex differences are a mystery, and dance the dance of gender.
Often, these exhortations of peace occur in the conclusions of
articles that heatedly denounce feminism. Thus, Professor Lasson ends
with a series of directions:
[Feminists] should avoid rash generalizations about men ...
should not make or agree with suggestions that women stifle
their femininity ... should seek to persuade with clarity and
concision, telling men why a certain type of new order (not
one in which women smash men's faces in) will be good for
them as well.... As sinners, after all, male and female were
created alike. Let us all celebrate our similarities as well as our
differences. Most men, like Mr. Justice Story, admire women
and want to understand them.72
In similar tone, albeit with a sociobiological accent, Davidson instructs:
Ultimately the feminist perspective must be rejected along with
the destructive chimeras it generates, and we must go back to
71. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 5; SAm KEEN, FIRE IN THE BELLY: ON BEING A MAN
(1991); Lasson, supra note 22, at 28; Morrow, supra note 69.
72. Lasson, supra note 22, at 28.
[Vol. 4:35
A FEMINIST THEORY OF MALEBASHING
nature, where men and women, not unisexism and female
chauvinism, circle each other like twin stars, in constant ten-
sion and mutual dependency. For that tension is the Dance of
Life itself, and not an ideological ramble into the absurd. 73
Perhaps the leading exemplar of this style of thinking, however, is
Sam Keen, whose immensely popular book Fire in the BeI 74 is one of
the central texts of the mythopoetic Men's Movement. 75 The movement's
origin lies in experiences with feminism and the changes it has caused in
gender relations. Robert Bly, the guru of the movement, endorses
feminism for women, but he also believes that feminism has made too
many men into "flying boys"-immature males without a deep sense of
their own masculinity.76 What is needed is a movement to bring modern
men back into touch with the Jungian animus, the fierce, hairy, but not
violent spirit that dwells within every male breast.' Let feminists have
feminism, Bly insists, but we men must have our own separate identity
as well.78 Despite allegations of misogyny,79 the movement claims to be
73. Davidson, supra note 5, at 44. Lance Morrow concludes a cover story for 7me
magazine in the same way:
If we were to leave off argument and think kindly for a moment, on the
premise that men and women will go on mixing with one another in the
current mindless and anarchic way, we might spin the thought that good
can come of each sex thinking the best of the other, and might see the
converse truth: that only bad can come of each one thinking the worst.
Tolerance and decency are creative, civilizing traits. A rising standard of
expectation-a mutual hope, a sympathetic mingling of desires-will lift
all boats. Quite a long time ago-remember?-we used to fall in love.
Morrow, supra note 69, at 53, 59. To his credit, and unlike Davidson or Lasson,
Morrow recognizes that men share some of the blame for this mutual animosity. See
Morrow, supra note 69, at 58. Like Lasson, but not like Davidson, Morrow also
purports to quarrel not "with Feminism per se, but with feminism incompletely or
dishonestly or opportunistically pursued." Morrow, supra note 69, at 57.
74. KEEN, supra note 71.
75. The movement may be most familiar to the general public in its stereotypical form:
men gathering in the woods to beat drums, chant, feel sorry for themselves, and
discover the Wild Man within. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 1, at 304-07. It would
appear that Keen himself is not directly involved in the movement, see KEEN, supra
note 71, at 245, but the movement has certainly adopted him. See E. ANTHONY
ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD: TRANsFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE
REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA 1-2 (1993).
76. See ROBERT BLY, IRON JOHN 2, 57 (1990). See also FALUDI, supra note 1, at 306-08.
77. See BLY, supra note 76, at 222-23, 227, 233, 237.
78. See BLY, supra note 76, at x, 234-36.
79. See, e.g., FALUDI, supra note 1, at 309-12.
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profeminist and to reject oppressive conceptions of manhood while also
proclaiming pride in a healthy and whole masculinity."0
Keen's argument follows the same general outline. He professes
admiration for what he calls "prophetic feminism," but he denounces
"ideological feminism.""' The difference between the two is "largely a
matter of mood, tone of voice, focus, emphasis, feeling-tone." 2 Not
surprisingly, the different "tone[s] of voice" involve differing attitudes
toward men. Prophetic feminism offers a "vision of what women may
become and a celebration of the feminine."8 3 Ideological feminism, by
contrast, "is animated by a spirit of resentment, the tactic of blame, and
the desire for vindictive triumph over men that comes out of the dog-
matic assumption that women are innocent victims of a male conspira-
cy."8 In short, prophetic feminism celebrates women; ideological femi-
nism denigrates men.
On closer inspection, however, the difference is not so simple.
Prophetic feminism also says some very negative things about men:
Western culture has been dominated by patriarchy ...
[, which] is rooted in hierarchy, obsession with power, control,
and government by violence. [Furthermore,] [w]arfare, rape,
and ecological destruction of "Mother" nature are rooted in
patriarchal habits of thought and modes of social organization;
misogyny and gynophobia. .. form the subtext of Western
"his-tory."85
If all of these perspectives are "enlightening,"86 then what could ideo-
logical feminism say that is so much worse? Apparently, the difference is
the degree of guilt: "This type of [ideological feminist] demonic theory
of history renders men responsible for all of the ills of society, and
women innocent."' Men are not wholly guilty, and women not wholly
innocent,88 and prophetic but not ideological feminism realizes this truth.
80. See BLY, supra note 76, at x, passim.
81. KEEN, supra note 71, at 195.
82. KEEN, supra note 71, at 195.
83. KEEN, supra note 71, at 195.
84. KEEN, supra note 71, at 196.
85. KEEN, supra note 71, at 196.
86. KEEN, supra note 71, at 196.
87. KEEN, supra note 71, at 200.
88. See KEEN, supra note 71, at 205-06.
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Still, if patriarchy and misogyny really have gripped Western culture,
then presumably men must share more of the blame and do more of the
changing to correct the situation. At one point, Keen seems to be
moving toward this conclusion. He observes, "[t]he task of reasonable
men and women, and courts of law, is to try to weigh innocence and
guilt on a scale that ranges from zero to one hundred percent depending
on the degree of freedom, insight, and range of opportunities that
exist."89 At the top of the guilt list stand "public officials who are
graduates of Ivy League universities."90 At this point, then, we might
expect that Keen On Malebashing would conclude: be aware of degree
differences; don't criticize men indiscriminately; don't criticize men
unless they deserve it; don't demonize.
In fact, however, Keen concludes that feminists should not criticize
men at all. Keen advises that reasonable men and women must weigh
guilt on a judicial model, but he also recommends a seemingly inconsis-
tent psychotherapeutic model in which guilt is an irrelevant and danger-
ous concept: "Perhaps the greatest single advance in psychological and
social theory in the last fifty years has been the emergence of systems-
thinking. Group therapy, family therapy, the Alcoholics Anonymous
movement are all based upon the discovery that power, responsibility,
action, blame are shared by all participants within a system." 9 In the
end, this therapeutic model wins Keen's allegiance:
Men have begun to feel their unique form of the pain of
victimization that has led to other liberation movements among
women and minorities. Until recently, we have all been uncon-
sciously playing assigned roles in a drama that we were not
aware of having created. THE SYSTEM is running us all .
[O]ur depression can turn into a sense of empowerment when
we begin to look carefully at the way men and women interact
in a codependent way to maintain the system.
92
89. KEEN, supra note 71, at 205.
90. KEEN, supra note 71, at 206.
91. KEEN, supra note 71, at 204.
92. KEEN, supra note 71, at 207.
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Keen proposes that our task shotild be to cooperate in "Ending the
Blame Game." 93 He explains ten rules of the blame game,94 the most
important of which are the last two. Rule nine is that "[t]he interactions
between the active-aggressive (traditionally male) and the passive-aggres-
sive (traditionally female) partners in the game are symmetrical and
equally 'powerful.' 95 Rule ten is that the game is over "when either
player jumps out of the horizon of the game and begins to examine the
social system that keeps both genders defined in a hostile-dependent,
mutually exclusive, competitive way.""6 Like the blame game itself, the
solution is essentially therapeutic and personal, not political: "[t] he fastest
path to ending the blame game is a committed relationship in which two
people agree to work together at the process of becoming conscious and
compassionate." 97 Ultimately, Keen offers us the obligatory reference to
the mystery of gender, the dance of gender, and the hope that we can
just go back to loving one another:
The question of gender is penultimately a problem, but ulti-
mately a mystery.... Throughout the eons of history we
move toward becoming fully human only through a sexual
dance of men and women....
Love increases the mystery of the self and the other. ...
Strangers in the night, opposites joined in a passionate dance,
keeping step to an echo of a distant harmony we must strain
to hear. Moving toward and away from each other; two be-
coming one becoming two becoming one, ad infinitum. 98
At this point, Keen has travelled very far from his starting premises.
It turns out that western culture has not been dominated by patriarchy;
it has been dominated by codependency in which everyone is a victim
and everyone is equally powerful. Keen's departure from the degree-of-
guilt idea is especially interesting. In repudiation of radical feminism,
Keen reasonably argues that we should pay attention to degrees of guilt;
93. KEEN, supra note 71, at 208.
94. See KEEN, supra note 71, at 208-09.
95. KEEN, supra note 71, at 209.
96. KEEN, supra note 71, at 209.
97. KEEN, supra note 71, at 210.
98. KEEN, supra note 71, at 218-20.
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as between men, some are less guilty than others. But in apparent
anticipation of the response that men as a class are more guilty than
women as a class, Keen responds that we should abandon the whole idea
of relative guilt as between the genders: "[i]t serves no useful purpose to
argue about who suffers most."99 So from the radical feminist claim that
all men are guilty alike, Keen rushes to the opposite pole: guilt is beside
the point. In effect, there are no guilty men and no guilty women.
Keen's most profound shift, however, involves the basic purpose of
gender theory analysis. In admiring prophetic feminism, he admires a
movement that boldly analyzes gender as a political construct and offers
political reforms. As Keen admits, "Western culture has been dominated
by patriarchy," and the solution is to break the power of the patriar-
chy.'00 Over the course of the next thirty pages, however, Keen shifts to
a very different purpose: apparently the key goal of gender analysis is not
to correct power imbalances, not to right injustice, not even to describe
the present condition of gender relations-any of which might lead to
some negative statements about men-but rather to promote gender
reconciliation.' Let us argue no more, blame no more, hurt no more.
Instead, let's dance. It'll be better. You'll see. Davidson, Lasson, and
Morrow reach essentially the same conclusion: "Quite a long time
ago-remember?-we used to fall in love."10 2
All of these writers, then, implicitly adopt a criterion for
malebashing. The test is not whether negative statements about men are
false or unjust; the test is whether they will increase hostility between the
genders. If men are easily offended-as at least some men are-then
almost all negative statements about men will increase hostility and, thus,
are malebashing. The basic message to feminists is clear: stop criticizing
men because it only makes everyone upset. It is difficult not to hear in
this message a yearning for a simpler day before women started protest-
ing injustice and asking men to change.
Admittedly, sweet talk about dancing and mysteries and love sounds
appealing. But such talk may obscure a harsher reality. In the real world,
in conventional dancing, men lead and women follow. It is easy to sit
patiently before a mystery if you experience the mystery as empowering.
And as a group, men may hate and abuse women more than they love
99. KEEN, supra note 71, at 211.
100. KEEN, supra note 71, at 196-207.
101. See KEEN, supra note 71, 211.
102. Morrow, supra note 69, at 59.
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them. Or at least all those things may be so; we will not know unless we
look. And we cannot look if every controversial statement about men is
rejected as "malebashing" on the grounds that it stirs rancor. This point,
so basic to modern feminism and so obvious, bears repeating. One
cannot know whether, to what extent, and in what way women are
oppressed until one actually looks. When one looks, one might discover
some not nice things about men, things that men do not like to think
about themselves or other men, things that men did not know about
themselves or other men. To correct oppression, one must examine how
widespread it is and by what mechanisms it continues. All this examina-
tion may make for depressing reading, perhaps some shame, perhaps
some rancor-and all of those results may be unfortunate. But without
the examination, we can never have justice. Reform always brings some
rancor. If we rule statements out of bounds because they cause controver-
sy, we have abandoned the search for equity.10 3
Feminists, of course, have dialogic responsibilities as well, and we
will examine those in later sections. There are good and bad ways to
make rancor-producing statements. Some rancor-producing statements
are dialogically illegitimate, though not because they produce rancor. And
feminists must pay attention to the forum in which they are speaking to
know when certain statements are appropriate. But all of these claims rest
on a crucial distinction: some negative statements about men are legiti-
mate, and others are not. Davidson, Keen, Lasson, and Morrow would
apparently block all such statements at the door of the party on the
grounds that they are upsetting the guests.
B. Beasts and Conspirators
A blanket condemnation of all negative statements about men, then,
is unwarranted, but a more specific definition of "malebashing" might be
possible. Among those who allege malebashing, two particular attacks on
men seem to rankle most: men are beasts by nature (as a result either of
biology or inevitable social conditioning); and men are engaged in a
universal, conscious conspiracy to oppress women.
103. Keen's movement from a political to a personal analysis of gender is a particularly
vivid example of this danger: he completely ignores the feminist argument that the
personal is political. In so doing, he-like Lasson, Davidson, Morrow, and oth-
ers-urges us all to improve our personal relationships, rather than to break the
power of patriarchy. And so systematic gender power imbalances suddenly disappear
into the private and individual world of the personal, where we can all just love each
other if we are giving, caring, and compromising enough.
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The idea that men are beasts and cannot help themselves did not
originate with modern feminism. It has been prominent in various
religious traditions, especially a feminized protestantism, for some time
in this country.10 4 It has been widely shared by a variety of women, not
just self-proclaimed feminists. °5 It has even been adopted by opponents
of feminism, although for conservative ends. Since men are beasts, the
argument goes, women must tame them by acting in traditional ways.
Otherwise, society will fall apart, with violent rogue males wandering the
landscape. 10
6
Despite its prevalence, the charge arouses particular animosity when
it comes from the mouths (or is placed in the mouths) of feminists. We
have already seen Professor Lasson allege that according to feminists,
gender differences are "immutable" and "biological." 0 7 We have also seen
that Lasson makes this claim without citation and in direct contradiction
to some of the feminists against whom he makes the allegation.' This
allegation seems to emerge not from the pages of any feminist writing,
but from some deep fantasy image of the "Man-hating Feminist."
Similarly, Lance Morrow declaims, "[here's] the tone exactly: Men-are-
animals-I-don't-care-if-they're-not-doing-anything-at-the-moment-they're-
thinking-about-it-and-they-will-when-they-have-the-chance."°109 The
attitude is aptly captured in the much resented charge that men suffer
from "testosterone poisoning": 110 men rape, kill, plunder the environ-
ment, dominate others, engage in alienated relationships, all by force of
hormones (or as an inevitable consequence of social conditioning-the
result is the same as long as men have no control over the process).
It is easy to understand why men resent this point of view. It casts
them as villains by nature, and there is nothing they can do about it.
Men are thus not actually responsible in a volitional sense for these
failings, and generally such an incapacity would excuse moral actors in
104. See, e.g., TED OWNBY, SUBDUING SATAN: RELIGION, REcREATION, AND MANHOOD IN
THE RURAL SOUTH 1865-i920 (1990).
105. See JUDITH LEVINE, My ENEMY, My LoVE: MAN-HATING AND AMBIVALENCE IN
WOMEN'S LrvEs 138-84 (1992).
106. See GEORGE GILDER, NAKED NoMADs: UNMARRIED MEN IN AMERICA 27-28, 75-76
(1974); GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE 39-40 (1986).
107. Lasson, supra note 22, at 12-13.
108. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
109. Morrow, supra note 69, at 54.
110. E.g., Tasker, supra note 69, at 15.
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our legal system.11' But the men-as-beasts view nonetheless blames men
for their nature, and the reason is not hard to surmise. The whole idea
that responsibility must rest on volition applies only to free, rational,
moral actors. When, because of unusual circumstances, such actors lack
moral capacity, they are excused. But men are not such actors; they are
brutes. Men's beastliness is not just a periodic eruption into an otherwise
benign nature, furnishing an excuse for occasional immoral acts. Rather,
men are so depraved that they are not even responsible moral actors; they
are beastly through and through. One blames them in the way that one
would blame a rabid dog, not a Kantian self. Under this view, feminist
writing is simple denunciation of men rather than an attempt to engage
them in conversation. The feminist future allows only two possibilities:
since men are hopeless, you could leave them, forming separatist societ-
ies,112 or you could kill enough of them to get them under control." 3
The universal-conspiracy view rankles as much as the men-as-beasts
view. Sam Keen, for example, argues that the universal-conspiracy view
is the basis of ideological feminism:
[I] deological feminism [rests on] the dogmatic assumption that
women are the innocent victims of a male conspiracy...
"Patriarchy" is the devil term, the code word for the evil
empire of men, the masculine conspiracy that has dominated
human history since the time of the fall. All of the great
agonies of our time are attributed to the great Satan of patriar-
chy.n 4
At its most extreme, this conspiracy theory argues that all men con-
sciously conspire to oppress women, so as to advance the interests of
men as a class:
Violence is described as being a tool, as it were, in an arsenal
of devices and strategies that are somehow tailor-made for the
defence of male domination, and the choice of one tool rather
than another is a consequence of conscious monitoring by men,
of the progress of the "struggle" to maintain women's subor-
111. See David C. Williams & Susan H. Williams, Volitionalism and Religiotu Liberty, 76
CORNELL L. Rav. 769 (1991).
112. See Morrow, supra note 69, at 59; Shibles, supra note 69, at 39 (citing one actual
feminist).
113. See KEN, supra note 71, at 199 (citing one actual feminist).
114. KEEN, supra note 71, at 196-97.
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dination. This kind of instrumentalism sometimes reduces to
a highly implausible species of conspiracy theory ... . '
Again, it is easy to understand why men, even feminist men, resent
this view. Most men do not experience themselves as having so much
power, and many men do not consciously oppress women. One writer
protests:
I know that I have at times been oppressive like many men,
and that domestic violence is a problem in many relationships.
But I'm far from sure that most men either have or experience
the power that feminism assumes they have. The traditional
oppressor (ie [sic] the colonialist, the Nazi, the coal mine
owner) has tangible individual power over those he controls
and they can't escape. I may, willy nilly, have been part of the
patriarchal order since my barmitzvah but I don't think that
has made me as much in control of my life, love and work as
most feminist analyses blithely assume." 6
Under this analysis, feminist conspiracy theories fail to (1) pay heed to
men's account of their own experiences, (2) draw a moral distinction
between those who benefit indirectly and unintentionally from patriarchy
and those who consciously and conspiratorially advance it, and (3)
explain how those who indirectly benefit from patriarchy are thereby
guilty of anything, since they cannot stop benefitting as long as they live
in a patriarchal society. As a result, even those who try to do good (or
at least not do bad) are held to account for the actions of the real
conspirators.
The men-as-beasts view and the universal-conspiracy view both
portray men as villains but in very different ways. In the men-as-beasts
view, men effectively have no agency. 1 7 Driven by biology or social
conditioning, they cannot change their nature. They are mindless
115. A. Mark Liddle, Feminist Contributions to An Understanding of Violence Against
Women-Three Steps Forward Two Steps Back, 26 CAuN. Rav. Soc. & ANrH. 759,
763 (1989) (emphasis in the original).
116. Cohen, supra note 69, at 31.
117. In the term "agency" we mean to include two analytically severable concepts: moral
freedom and practical power. Therefore, "agency" broadly refers to the ability to
shape one's own life, because one has both an incompletely determined will and some
power to effect that will. In this sense, agency might be synonymous with meaningful
self-determination. Thus defined, agency lies on a continuum; it is not an absolute
concept.
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animals. In the universal-conspiracy view, by contrast, men have enor-
mous scope of agency. They hold all the power in society, and they
freely and deliberately act to promote patriarchy. They are cunning,
ingenious conspirators.
The rebuttal to each view also dwells on issues of agency, but again
in quite different ways. To the men-as-beasts view, many men want to
respond: "Biology is not destiny. I am not condemned by hormones or
social conditioning to be a brute. I have enough conscious agency to
make myself into a good man." To the universal-conspiracy view, many
men want to respond: "I don't have that much control, so I'm not
responsible. I'm part of a patriarchal culture, and I may get benefits from
that culture, I may even still hold some sexist attitudes from my upbring-
ing. But I didn't make that culture and I don't know how to get out of
its snare altogether. How could I not receive patriarchal benefits from a
patriarchal culture? And how could I ever wholly escape the training of
my childhood?"
At an analytical level, then, the two views are very different. At the
level of emotional threat and argumentative structure, however, the two
views seem to be quite similar. Whether men are brutes or universal
conspirators, all or substantially all men participate in the oppression of
women, in more or less the same way if not always to the same extent,
The message is loud and clear: Do not excuse yourself-no more
"present company excepted." Many men may be prepared to indict
others but wish to excuse themselves and their loved ones: "[A] lot of
men feel they have been swept into a net where they don't belong and
they consider it unfair." ' So, in response to the men-as-beasts view,
they say: "I'm not like that because I have more agency." In response to
the universal-conspiracy view, they also say: "I'm not like that because I
don't have that much agency."
As a result, when men respond to one of these two views, they often
could as well be responding to the other, because for emotional purposes
the two are not very different.1 9 For example, Lance Morrow objects
118. Dube, supra note 66, at A2 (quoting Donald Whyte of Carleton University).
119. As usual, television may capture the emotional outlook best. In a recent Murphy
Brown episode, sober and decent Jim Dial exclaims: "I have never raped, pillaged or
burned anyone! Do you know what it's like being 55, male and white these days, and
being blamed for everything from slavery to the destruction of the ozone layer?"
Stein, supra note 69, at 30. He feels blamed here for the actions of others. He wants
to claim that he is not like that. But it is not clear why he is being blamed-because
he is a conspirator or a brute or both?
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specifically to the men-as-beasts view, but his objection could also be
made to the universal-conspiracy view without changing a word: "The
psychology produces a technique of gender slur that might be called
Worst Case Synecdoche: All men are assumed to be as bad as the very
worst among them."12 Nicholas Davidson elides the two views when,
again without citation, he insists that feminists see men as "omnipotent
[i.e., universal-conspiratorial] and inevitable [i.e., beasts-by-nature]
villains."'1
21
This similarity may be most apparent in the response to the feminist
analysis of rape. The locus classicus of conspiracy theories is Susan
Brownmiller's assertion that rape is "nothing more or less than a con-
scious process of intimidation by which all men keep all women in a state
of fear."'122 At the same time, some have attributed to MacKinnon and
Dworkin the view that all men are rapists by nature. 12' At an analytical
level, it makes a great deal of difference whether "all men are rapists"
because of biology or conspiracy, but at an emotional level, it makes
much less difference. The key response to both views is that men are not
all the same.' 2
4
In short, the allegations of malebashing proceed on two levels. On
the first, analytical level, some men assert a quite specific charge against
feminists: feminists claim that men are brutes or conspirators, and such
claims are not true. On the second, emotional level, the cry is much
more direct: "It's not true of me-leave me a doorway to dignity out of
this hostile territory." Much of the discourse about malebashing may
really be about this emotional subtext. Perhaps such a subtext is inevita-
ble because, understandably enough, men feel accused and hence defen-
sive in response to allegations of universal male perfidy. Discerning this
emotional response, feminists may feel overly inclined to discount
protestations of malebashing. Indeed, the point in charges like
Brownmiller's may precisely be to leave men no out.125 These feminists
might say to men: "Don't be too quick to excuse yourselves. Examine
120. Morrow, supra note 69, at 58.
121. Davidson, supra note 5, at 43. Inadvertently, Davidson here poses the ancient
theological conundrum: if you are truly omnipotent, how can anything you do be
inevitable?
122. SUsAN BROWNMILLER, AGINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN, AND RAPE 15 (1975).
123. See, e.g., Morrow, supra note 69, at 58.
124. See, e.g., KEEN, supra note 71, at 205-06 (on universal-conspiracy); Morrow, supra
note 69, at 58 (on men-as-beasts).
125. See supra text accompanying note 122.
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your own conduct and attitudes with care; virtually everyone is contam-
inated with patriarchal attitudes." Moreover, once the escape valve is
opened, it may be hard to stem the flood of avoidance. The chain of
reasoning is not hard to imagine: "I'm not like that so these statistics
can't be true."" 6 If my friends and I are good men, there must be more;
we cannot be the only ones. So if there are some good men, there must
be many. From there, the next step is easy but significant: If many men
are good, isn't it likely that most men are good?2 7 If most men are good,
then men could feel proud of being men again. No more would we/they
have to bemoan, "Sometimes I feel bad being a guy."' And if all of that
is true, wouldn't it really be better to dance and forget this whole thing?
And so we retrace Sam Keen's flight: from asserting that not all men are
guilty, we race to the conclusion that all men are not guilty.
As tempting as it is to continue on this emotional level, we will not
come to a clearer view of malebashing as long as we do so. It may be
perfectly understandable that some feminists may make universal accusa-
tions so as to command male attention. It may also be perfectly under-
standable that some men may seek to turn aside that accusation without
examining their own conduct or attitudes. But this game of attack-and-
defend, this strictly instrumental use of words, does not in the long run
advance analysis. Accordingly, we intend in the next section to take
seriously the analytical element and ignore the emotional subtext of the
men-as-beasts and universal-conspiracy views. These two views may offer
the basis of a feminist theory of malebashing.
SECTION THREE: FEMINISM, DIALOGUE, AND MALEBASHING
Although it cannot be the case that all criticisms of men are off-
limits for feminists, it may nonetheless be true that certain types of
criticism are inappropriate or illegitimate, at least in an academic dia-
logue. In this Section, we explore two different sources of constraints on
criticism of men. First, in subsection A., we argue that feminism's own
assumptions and commitments give rise to certain limits on the types of
legitimate criticism. We argue that feminist values require a rejection of
126. Dube, supra note 66, at A2 (quoting Eileen Saunders of Carleton University, who
argues that "[plersonalizing the problem" in this way is "denying the problem").
127. Remember Lasson's assertion of faith that "most men" "abhor" rape and "do not
oppress most women"-protesting at the same time that one could never prove such
a thing. Lasson, supra note 22, at 18.
128. Dube, supra note 66, at A2 (quoting a twenty-two year old male).
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the views of agency inherent in the two versions of malebashing we have
identified: the men-as-beast argument and the male conspiracy theory.
Second, in subsection B., we describe how dialogic norms-particularly
those dialogic norms adopted by some feminists-generate similar
constraints on the participants in a scholarly conversation. These two
subsections are largely independent. Either one alone, if persuasive,
should suffice to make the case that certain kinds of criticism of men are
illegitimate in an academic dialogue and may justifiably be called
malebashing.
Finally, in subsection C., we consider how a definition of male-
bashing based on these two sets of values might actually function. This
subsection discusses the application of norms concerning malebashing to
these "intermediate" claims. The norms we suggest provide a basis for
criticizing some of these intermediate claims as akin to malebashing.
Nonetheless, we also believe that in such cases men have an obligation
not to deflect the conversation from the merits of the feminist argument
at issue to a debate over whether the feminist speaker is engaged in
malebashing.
A. General Feminist Values
The two types of attacks on men we identified earlier define the end
points of a continuum of positions on the issue of agency. The conspira-
cy theory implies that all men make a conscious choice to promote
patriarchy in general and/or to oppress and dominate the women in their
lives in particular. This theory assumes full, individual agency exercised
in a deliberate and calculating way. The men-as-beasts approach, on the
other hand, implies practically no individual agency at all. Men are so
completely at the mercy of either biology or social conditioning that they
are simply incapable of choosing to alter their behavior. These two
extreme positions on agency are, however, inconsistent with some of the
deepest and most widely shared commitments of feminist theory. They
are, therefore, inappropriate within a feminist argument in academic
discourse.129
129. As we mentioned in the Introduction, it is possible that different norms might apply
in other contexts, such as a consciousness raising group or a political rally. See supra
pp. 2-3. Our argument in this Section is devoted exclusively to the context of
scholarly dialogue and debate.
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1. The Universal Male Conspiracy Theory
The possibility of absolute and unconditioned individual agency is
at odds with the common feminist commitment to the analysis of gender
as a social construct that shapes the consciousness of individuals. This
shaping may take place through the processes of identity formation in
early childhood,13 the development of sexual identity in later childhood
or adolescence, 13 or the experiences of sexually mature adulthood. 13 2
Feminists have spent considerable time and energy examining the ways
in which the social construction of gender constrains and damages
women. Indeed, it is a central tenet of modern feminist theory that
gender identity is not simply a freely chosen individual characteristic, but
a system of social relations backed by meaningful sanctions. 133
Part of the constraint of gender is, of course, purely external, such
as the barriers to entry and success in many professions'34 and the
widespread violence against women.13 5 But some of the most important
constraints become internalized in ways that affect agency. For instance,
women may define themselves in ways that make certain professions
either unattractive or difficult, even as external barriers are coming
down. 131 Or women may respond to the threat of violent expropriation
130. See generally NANCY CHODOROW, THE REPRODUCTION OF MOTHERING: PSYCHO-
ANALYSIS AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF GENDER (1978).
131. See generally EMILY HANcoCic, THE GIRL WITHIN (1989).
132. See MACKINNON, Linda's Life and Andreas Work, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra
note 53, at 127, 127-29 (on the relationship between the experience of pornography
victims and women generally); Martha R. Mahoney, Legallmages ofBattered Women,
90 MICH. L. REv. 1, 18 (1991); Robin L. West, The Difference in Women s Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory, 3 Wisc. WOMEN'S L.J.
81 (1987) [hereinafter West, Hedonic Lives].
133. See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 194 (1990).
134. For discussions of such barriers in the legal profession, see Ann J. Gellis, Great
Expectations: Women in the Legal Profession, A Commentary on State Studies, 66 IND.
L.J. 941, 941, 947, 949 (1991); Marina Angel, Women in Legal Education: What ts
Like To Be Part of a Perpetual First Wave or the Case of the Disappearing Women, 61
TEMP. L. REv. 799, 801-03 (1988); Deborah Round, Note, Gender Bias in the
Judicial System, 61 S. CAL. L. R~v. 2193, 2202 (1988).
135. Between two and four million women are beaten by their partners each year. See
Council on Scientific Affairs, Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medical Practitio-
ners, 276 (23) JAMA 3184-89 (1992).
136. See Lani Guinier et al., Becoming Gentlemen: Women's Experiences at One Ivy League
Law School, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 42-43 (1994); Catherine Weiss & Louise Melling,
The LegalEducation of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REv. 1299, 1313-20 (1988); Sue
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by defining themselves as "giving selves" as a way of defusing the expe-
rience of threat: you cannot harm me by taking from me what I freely
give to you. 37
In such situations, it is no longer meaningful to speak of external
or internal constraints. The point is that culture permeates; it exists both
within and between people. It is also no longer meaningful to speak in
terms of full or simple individual agency. No feminist would say that the
woman who has defined herself as a giving self in a violently sexist
society has simply "chosen" to support that patriarchal culture. The sort
of unconstrained choice assumed by this model of agency is impossible
in the world made visible from this feminist perspective.
Perhaps it is easiest to see the constraints of culture when they lead
to "choices" that come at a great cost to the individual agent, as in the
acceptance of violence. It may be less obvious that cultural constraints are
at work where the "choice" is one that seems to serve the agent's inter-
ests. It is undoubtedly the case that many men, perhaps even all men,
sometimes act in ways that perpetuate the gender hierarchy in which
they dominate. But there is no reason to believe that those actions are
the product of autonomous individual choice (of the kind necessary to
support a conscious conspiracy) rather than of social conditioning.
Indeed, while it is certainly possible that some men make conscious
choices to support patriarchy as a means of serving their own interests, 138
V. Rosser, The Relationship Between Women's Studies and Women in Science, in
FEMINIsT APPROACHES TO SCIENCE 167 (Ruth Bleier ed., 1986). One of the most
striking and controversial examples of this phenomenon is found in the testimony of
the historian Rosalind Rosenberg in the Sears case. EEOC v. Sears Roebuck & Co.,
628 F. Supp. 1264 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). Joan C.
Williams, Deconstructing Gender, 87 MICH. L. REv. 797, 813-15 (1989). Sears was
accused of gender discrimination because women were underrepresented in its higher
paid commission sales force. Williams, supra, at 813. Sears defended by presenting
Rosenberg's testimony that women chose not to pursue these higher paying jobs
because of their commitments to home, family, and non-confrontational interactions.
Williams, supra, at 814-15. One need not find such evidence an acceptable defense
to a Title VII action in order to admit that social constraints based on gender can
be internalized in this way.
137. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 94.
138. By asserting that some meaningful choices are possible, we are explicitly refusing to
abandon individual autonomy entirely. As we will explain in the discussion of the
men-as-beasts criticism, see infra text accompanying notes 144-86, a view that sees
social construction as simply destiny is also in tension with some deep feminist
commitments. Human agency and motivation is, in other words, a complex and
multifaceted thing. We believe that the degree of social constructionism required by
a feminist analysis of gender does not demand that we ignore or oversimplify this
complexity.
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it is plain that many men act in ways that promote gender hierarchy
without any conscious choice at all, simply because that is the way they
understand their own gender identity. Both in terms of external and
internal constraints, men's gender roles are backed up by the same sorts
of cultural forces as women's."' This is not to say, of course, that these
gender roles cause equal harm to both groups. It is merely to say that
they both are gender roles, categories socially constructed and enforced
rather than simply the products of conscious, individual choice. 4
The point is that the conspiracy theory rests on a simple notion of
autonomous agency that has been abandoned by feminist theory. There
are, of course, many difficult, related issues over which feminists dis-
agree-for example, whether there is some biological basis for gender
identity'41 and whether some less extreme concept of autonomy would
be useful or necessary for women.'4 Regardless of how one decides such
issues, however, if one recognizes gender as (at least in part) a social
construct that shapes individual consciousness, then one cannot accept
139. See, e.g., R.W. CONNELL, GENDERAND PoWER 183-88 (1987) [hereinafter CONNELL,
GENDER AND POWER]; ROBERT L GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISToRY
261 (1993); ROTUNDA, supra note 75, at 291-92.
140. A rejection of the conspiracy theory does not necessarily free men from moral
responsibility for the existence of a patriarchal system. First, men who are not
conscious conspirators are not necessarily less blameworthy than men who are. It is
possible that a man who beats his wife without any conscious thought of contributing
to gender hierarchy is more morally culpable than one who works for the passage of
legislation restricting women's work options for the explicit reason that it will help
to maintain patriarchy. As this example suggests, there are many ways to measure
moral blameworthiness. Conscious promotion of inequality is certainly relevant, but
it is not necessarily dispositive. Second, even men who are not morally culpable for
the system of patriarchy may nonetheless have a moral responsibility to work to
change that system. Even if one is not morally culpable for causing a certain injustice,
one may have a moral responsiblity to correct it because one continues to benefit
from it or because of one's position of power. See generally Cheshire Calhoun,
Responsibility and Reproach, 99 ETHics 389 (1989) (arguing that people may be
subject to reproach and held responsible for moral failings even when they are not
individually blameworthy under traditional notions of responsibility). Arguments
about what moral, responsibilities men bear for sexism are not malebashing as long
as they do not ascribe the types of agency that we discuss in the text.
141. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 20-27 (describing a "material"
rather than cultural explanation for women's difference from men and exploring the
unwillingness of many legal feminists to accept this explanation).
142. See generally Susan H. Williams, A Feminist Reassessment of Civil Society, 72 IND. L.J.
417 (1997) (proposing a feminist model of autonomy); Jennifer Nedelsky,
Reconceiving Autonomy: Sources, Thoughts and Possibilities, 1 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 7
(1989) (discussing both the difficulties with and the need for a feminist vision of
autonomy).
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the claim that gender hierarchy is a consciously chosen conspiracy by all
men.
The conspiracy theory is also in tension with another widely shared
value of feminist theory: the insistence on listening to people's own
accounts of their experience. Many men report that they do not experi-
ence themselves as choosing to be the conscious manipulators of patriar-
chal power. First, they do not feel nearly as powerful as that scenario
implies. 43 Second, they experience themselves as trying, however imper-
fectly, to promote gender equality rather than gender hierarchy. 4' If
feminists are truly committed to listening to how people actually experi-
ence their lives, they must take these accounts seriously.'45
Taking these accounts seriously does not, of course, mean uncriti-
cally accepting the speaker's initial assessment of his own situation. Men
may have more power than they are aware of, and even those who
believe that they are trying to promote equality may be doing far more
for the cause of hierarchy than they realize. If we use women's con-
sciousness raising groups as a model, then to take men's accounts
seriously may mean using such accounts as the starting point rather than
the ending point of analysis. 4
6
Nonetheless, if men's accounts of their experience are considered
part of the starting point, along with women's accounts of their experi-
ence, then the conspiracy theory has a large strike against it. Even if
many men have more power and do more harm than they realize, their
own accounts of their motivations surely raise extremely serious questions
about the existence of a conscious conspiracy.'47 Unless we believe they
143. See KATHLEEN GERSON, No MAN'S LAND: MEN'S CHANGING COMMITMENTS TO
FAMILY AND WORK 13-14, 147-50, 265-68 (1993); MARK GERZON, A CHOICE OF
HEROES: THE CHANGING FACES OF AMERICAN MANHOOD 14-16, 127, 131 (1982);
GRISWOLD, supra note 139, at 237-39.
144. See GERSON, supra note 143, at 15, 158-64, 166-67, 266-67; GRISWOLD, SUpra note
139, at 223-25, 245-47; cf ROTUNDA, supra note 75, at 9.
145. Feminists are, of course, committed to listening to women, but they should also be
concerned with listening to men's accounts of their experience. Because women's
voices have been silenced for so long they may have an additional claim to be heard
that men's voices do not share. Nonetheless, the basic demand to take seriously
people's accounts of their own experience arises from a simple notion of respect for
persons that applies to men as well as women.
146. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REv. 829, 863-64
(1990).
147. One might, of course, still daim that there was an unconscious conspiracy; that is, that
promoting patriarchy is these men's actual motivation even if they are unaware of it
consciously. As to this claim, men's own accounts might be relevant evidence but
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are simply lying, then it is not possible that these men are consciously
attempting to promote patriarchy. Taking people's accounts seriously
must mean at least that we start with a presumption that they are not
lying. 48
2. The Men-As-Beasts Theory
The second kind of attack on men that we identified involved the
claim that men are incapable of being other than patriarchal brutes. This
men-as-beasts theory suggests that, because of either biology or cultural
training, all men engage in some set of evil or destructive behaviors:
dominating women, exhibiting violent aggression on a large scale (war)
or a small scale (spousal and child abuse), destroying the environment,
or simply being unable to have a truly giving relationship. The point is
that such behavior is hard-wired, so that efforts by individual men to
avoid this destiny are transitory and marginal at best, futile at worst.
a. Inherency
Like the conspiracy theory, this men-as-beasts theory is inconsistent
with some extremely important and widely shared feminist commitments.
First, just as feminism cannot do without some degree of social construc-
tionism, on the one hand, it also cannot function within a world-view
of simple and complete determinism, on the other. Feminism's rejection
of determinism is clearest in the case of biological determinism. Indeed,
the claim that biology is destiny has been one of the major targets of
they would certainly not be dispositive. This contention might be worth arguing
about, but it is simply not a conspiracy theory in the sense we are using that term:
it does not imply the kind of autonomous individual choice that makes the conspira-
cy theory objectionable from within the feminist perspective. Indeed, it may be just
an example of the social construction discussed above. Thus, the meaning of such a
"conspiracy" is entirely different from the meaning of the conspiracy theory as we
have described it.
148. It is hard to even imagine the kind of evidence one would need to show that all men
are lying when they say that they are not consciously trying to promote patriarchy.
Indeed, it is not clear that such a proof is practically possible, although it may be
logically possible. Our point here, however, is simply that a feminist commitment to
listening to people's accounts of their experience requires that the burden of such a
proof rest on the proponents of conspiracy theories. Until that onerous burden is
met, we must assume that not all men are lying.
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feminist criticism in the twentieth century.' 9 Obviously, if women are
fated by their (reproductive) biology to be dependent on men, then
patriarchy would be close to inevitable. 50 The feminist program of
greater equality for women has, as a matter of both history and logic,
rejected the claim that biology determines behavior and character in any
simple, deterministic way. 5' To the extent that the men-as-beasts claim
rests on such biological determinism, it is in tension with this long-held
position.
Complete cultural determinism raises somewhat more complicated
issues, but it too is ultimately unacceptable from a feminist point of
view. According to a thoroughgoing cultural determinism, women along
with men should be utterly incapable of escaping their sex roles. Indeed,
if social conditioning were so simply and completely determinative, a
woman in a sexist society should not even be able to see, let alone adopt,
a feminist view.'
52
Feminists, however, want and need to claim both that ours is a
sexist society and that feminism is possible. There are, of course, many
ways to reconcile the reality of cultural influence with the possibility of
feminism. First, one could point out that our culture, while undoubtedly
sexist, is not monolithic: it provides resources on which feminists may
149. See, e.g., Ruth Bleier, Sex Differences Research: Science or Belie., in FEMINIST AP-
PROACHES TO SCIENCE 147 (Ruth Bleier ed., 1986).
150. "[C]Iose to inevitable" rather than simply inevitable because there are ways of treating
even dependent persons with equal respect. Indeed, once we recognize that all people
are interdependent, those relations of dependence may themselves become the basis
for claims of respect and rights. See MINOW, supra note 133, at 299-306 (assessing
arguments against children's rights).
151. Feminists have rejected not only global determinism (i.e., patriarchy as biological
necessity) but also trait-specific determinism (e.g., female passivity as biologically
determined). See, e.g., RuTH BLEIER, SCIENCE AND GENDER 73 (1984) (suggesting
that woman's "nature"--induding passivity, sensitivity, nurturing-is a result of
patriarchal assignment of functions, not the cause); Bleier, Sex Differences Research,
supra note 149 (discussing research comparing visuospatial processing and mathe-
matical ability between men and women). Some modern feminists may, of course,
believe that biology has some impact on gender differences, see infra text accompa-
nying note 327, but they generally resist the idea that this impact is independent of
cultural influences. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Introduction, in THEOREMCAL
PERSPECTIVES ON SEXUAL DIFFERENCE 1, 4 (Deborah L. Rhode ed., 1990) ("For
example, we cannot understand sex-based differentials of height, weight, and physical
strength without considering the influence of diet, dress, division of labor, and so
forth.").
152. For a discussion of Catharine MacKinnon, who is sometimes accused of this type of
complete social determinism, see infra text accompanying notes 341-64.
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draw in challenging gender hierarchy. Second, one could argue that the
actual experiences of women, and the pain caused by those experiences,
provide a source and motive for seeing gender in a new way.' 53 Whatever
the merits of or difficulties with these arguments, 154 they will not suffice
to make the men-as-beasts view acceptable. After all, the same mecha-
nisms that allow women to embrace feminism should allow men to
escape their ordained gender roles. In other words, the simplistic deter-
minism implicit in the men-as-beasts theory is an unworkable stance for
feminism, and the more subtle arguments that feminists make (to
maintain social constructionism while avoiding simplistic determinism)
are in conflict with the men-as-beasts claim.
The first feminist path away from simple determinism is to point
out that our culture is extremely varied, including strands that pull in
different directions and that are, at times, even inconsistent. While a
great deal of that culture incorporates notions of gender roles that
promote male domination, feminists have nonetheless found support for
gender equality in such varied cultural sources as liberal equality values,' 55
Marxist analysis, 156 and even traditional feminine moral virtue. 157 Even
if patriarchy is the dominant cultural pattern, women are able to recog-
nize its flaws and reject it because the culture also contains secondary
themes that provide a conceptual foundation for that contrary view.
If such resources are available to women, however, they are also
available to men. Indeed, most feminists need to be committed to the
idea that men can escape the sexist assumptions of their culture. If
feminism is to have any practical impact in a world characterized by
patriarchy, men must be convinced to give up some of their power.
Unless women are planning to form separatist societies, and maybe not
even then, 15 they must rely on the cooperation of at least some men to
153. See, e.g., Alison M. Jaggar, Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology, in
GENDER/BoDY/KNOWLEDGE: FEMINIST RECONSTRUCTIONS OF BEING AND KNOWING
145, at 160 (Alison M. Jaggar & Susan R. Bordo eds., 1989); Catharine MacKinnon,
Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence, 8 SIGNS
635, 635 (1983) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism].
154. For a fuller discussion of these approaches, see Susan H. Williams, Feminist Legal
Epistemology, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 63, 83-89 (1993).
155. See infra text accompanying notes 284-97 (discussing Wendy Williams and liberal
feminism).
156. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, supra note 153.
157. See LYNN SHEaR , FAILURE IS IMPOSSIBLE: SUSAN B. ANrHONY IN HER OWN WORDS
295-96 (1995) (citing an 1898 speech).
158. Obviously, separatist feminists could theoretically maintain that men cannot escape
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achieve their goals. If men were truly unable to embrace some feminist
goals, then most forms of feminism would be pretty theories with little
chance of changing the realities of people's lives. Modern feminism's
commitment to tying theory to practice and its concern about making
a real difference in the world 159 require that we not write off (the
presently more powerful) half of humanity. 161
patriarchy without endangering their political agenda. There is some serious question,
however, whether meaningful numbers of such separatist societies could successfully
exist as a practical matter within or alongside unreconstructed patriarchal ones. In any
event, non-separatist feminists cannot completely give up on men if they wish to
achieve any practical goals. We believe it is fair to characterize non-separatist feminist
theories as the majority.
159. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectics of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the
Women's Movement, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW: FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY
301, 304-05 (Martha Fineman & Nancy Thomadsen eds., 1991). See generally
Symposium: Feminism in the 9os: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Practice, 4 YALE
J.L. & FEMINISM 1-190 (1991).
160. One response some feminists might make to this argument is that women have an
epistemic advantage when it comes to escaping their society's dominant views
precisely because they are at the bottom of the hierarchy. People who are oppressed
find the majority myths of their culture constantly disproved by their own experience.
Slaves know, for example, that slavery does not make them happier than freedom.
And women know that sexual harassment is not flattering, but threatening. See
Jagger, supra note 153, at 162. The dissonance caused by these experiences gives
those on the bottom the motive and the ability to question the received truths of
their culture. Men, being dominant in our gender hierarchy, are less likely to find
their preconceptions challenged by their experiences and are, therefore, less able to
escape their gender roles.
There is little doubt that those who suffer the most have the most incentive to
question the existing order. The difference between women and men in this regard
is, nonetheless, no reason to believe that men are simply incapable of such question-
ing. Women may be more likely to escape the dominant culture, but men can do so
in exactly the same way, even if they lack women's epistemic advantage and so might
not escape in the same numbers. It appears, for example, that men also experience
some hardships and contradictions that might cause them to question their gender
roles. Certainly, many men have experienced serious pain because of the limits their
gender role places on their relationships with their fathers, see GRISWOLD, supra note
139, at 266-67, their life partners, see ROTUNDA, supra note 75, at 292-93, and their
children, see GRISWOLD, supra note 139, at 248-50. Some men may find, for
example, that their "autonomy" is alienating rather than exhilarating. See ROTUNDA,
supra note 75, at 6, 292-93. Some may even discover that a woman may be
emotionally stronger or more stable than they are themselves and that relying on such
strength is reassuring rather than threatening. See GERSON, supra note 143, at
167-70. Such experiences could be the discordant notes that lead men to reassess
their preconceptions. Since it is possible for some men to escape in the same way as
women, the men-as-beasts theory, which requires that men cannot escape at all, is not
consistent with this feminist view.
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In fact, some men have embraced feminist goals. John Stuart Mill,
for example, rejected the subordination of women because it violates
liberal equality principles.' Ken Karst has drawn on both liberal and
communitarian theory as a foundation for his staunch support for
feminist goals. 162 Derrick Bell has put his ideas on the connection
between racism and sexism into action by renouncing his position at
Harvard Law School because the faculty would not hire an African-
American woman. 6 3 More generally, in the last two decades, feminist
men have developed a critique and analysis of oppressive, socially con-
structed definitions of masculinity.
164
It is not only in the exalted realms of theory and academia that men
have managed to escape from sexist assumptions. Daily life is full of
examples, large and small, of men rejecting some aspect of patriarchal
ideology: the man who glories in his daughter's athletic or scholastic
achievements; the man who promotes a woman worker rather than her
male competitor; the man who votes for a woman judge or legislator; the
man who takes equal responsibility for the burdens and joys of child-
rearing. These examples do not in any way diminish the reality or
oppressiveness of patriarchy, but they do demonstrate that men, like
women, can sometimes use the conflicting strands of their culture to
escape from sexist assumptions. 16 5 Indeed, in recent years, the call to
(Creconstruct" or "transform" cultural notions of masculinity has become
widespread. 166
161. See JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN (2d ed. 1911).
162. See, e.g., KENNETH KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 105-24 (1989); Kenneth L.
Karst, Woman's Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447 (describing two kinds of recon-
structions of the construct of "woman" in the law).
163. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, CONFRONTING AirHoRITY: REFLEcrIONS OF AN
ARDENT PROTESTER (1994).
164. See generally R. W. CONNELL, MASCULINITIES (1995); MICHAEL MESSNER, POWER AT
PLAY (1992).
165. See CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER, supra note 139, at 278-93; GERSON, supra note
143, at 22-37, 260-68; GERZON, supra note 143, at 236-62; GRISWOLD, supra note
139, at 269; ROTUNDA, supra note 75, at 1-2, 7-9.
166. See CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER, supra note 139, at 286-93; GRISWOLD, supra
note 139, at 257, 261; GERZON, supra note 143, at 233-62; Michael S. Kimmel, The
Contemporary 'Crisis' of Masculinity in Historical Perspective, in THE MAKING OF
MASCULINMS 121 (Harry Brod ed., 1987); Anthony McMahon, Male Readings of
Feminist Theory: The Psychologization of Sexual Politics in the Masculinity Literature,
22 THEORY & Soc'y 675, 691 (1993). See generally BLY, supra note 76; KEEN, supra
note 71.
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A reader might be tempted to reply that such exceptional men only
prove the rule that the rest of their fellows are hopeless beasts. Propo-
nents of the men-as-beasts view might, therefore, try to save their
position from our critique by a simple modification of their position:
perhaps not all men are beasts, but the overwhelming majority are. Such
an alteration in the argument, however, changes the nature of the
discussion in a very significant way. The claim that men are beasts can
no longer be an analytical claim-that it is inherent in the nature of men
to be beasts. It must now involve empirical evidence and observation
and, as such, it is subject to qualification and quantification. 67 How
many men are beastly, and in what ways? And, of course, how many are
not? What is it that allows some men to escape and what could we
change to increase their numbers? This discussion is one in which men
can be full participants, without renouncing their masculinity at the
door. It is a discussion that demands attention to context and to individ-
uals and to evidence rather than to abstract and universalizing concep-
tions of gender. As a result, this position is meaningfully more respectful
of men's agency than the simple men-as-beasts claim, while still being
completely consistent with the commitments of most modern feminisms.
The men-as-beasts theory also violates the feminist commitment to
the recognition and acceptance of diversity, including diverse models of
gender identity. The variations in female gender identity are mirrored by
variations in male gender identity. As a result, an approach that insists
that all men share some particular version of "toxic masculinity" is
insensitive to this variation and inconsistent with this commitment.
Feminist theory has often addressed "women's experience" as though
all women were the same. Women of color, working class and poor
women, lesbians, and others have, however, been speaking out with
increasing volume about the dangers of this assumption."16 These women
167. We do not mean to privilege empirical methodologies by emphasizing the non-
analytic quality of this modified claim. As the questions for investigation we suggest
in the text dearly indicate, these issues are prescriptive as well as descriptive and will
require explicitly normative arguments along with statistical or experiential ones. The
point is simply that such arguments are opened up rather than foreclosed by this
change in the nature of the daim.
168. For a small sample of this literature, see Angela P Harris, Race and Essentialism in
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. Rsv. 581 (1990); THiS BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK:
WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR (Cherrie Moraga & Gloria Anzaldua eds.,
1983); Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S L.J. 191 (1989-90) (examining feminist legal theory from a lesbian
perspective); Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive Laws, Women of Color, and Low-
Income Women, 11 WOMEN'S RTs. L. REP. 15 (1989).
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do not merely claim to experience sexism combined with some other
form of oppression (e.g., racism, classism, homophobia). Their argument
is much more profound. They argue that what it means to be a woman
is different depending on factors like one's race or class or sexual orienta-
tion.' 69 In other words, there are multiple constructions of femaleness
and femininity. To assume that there is only one such construction,
shared by all women regardless of their other differences, is to falsify the
gender experiences of many women and force them into a unitary mold
at the cost of violence to their identities. Feminists have taken to heart
this criticism from within the ranks. A debate continues to rage over the
extent to which it is either legitimate or useful to speak of "women" as
a category at all, 170 but that debate is not relevant to our limited point.
Even the proponents of such a general category usually admit that, at
least on some important subjects, there will be variations in the meaning
of gender identity, variations that track other cultural divides. 17 1
The same sort of variation exists in male gender identity. Identifi-
able cultural factors, such as race, class, sexual orientation, religion, and
others, have an impact on the construction of masculinity, just as they
do on femininity.172 Indeed, given that gender roles are usually con-
structed in relation to each other, it would be quite astonishing if
variation in one role were not matched by variation in the other. The
men-as-beasts theory ignores such cultural variations in masculinity.
There is a second source of diversity within gender models as well.
Even within the "majority" (i.e., white, heterosexual, middle-class) model,
feminists have found multiple femininities. 1" The cultural symbols of
169. See Harris, supra note 168, at 596-601; ELIZABETH V. SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL
WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF EXcLUSION IN FEMINIST THOUGHT 114-32 (1988).
170. Compare, for example, Martha L. Fineman, Challenging Law, ErtablishingDiffrences:
The Future of Feminist Legal Scholarship, 42 FLA. L. Rav. 25, 26 (1990) (arguing for
"the theoretical and political necessity of establishing the differences between men
and women"), with Linda Nicholson, Interpreting Gender, 20 SIGNS 79, 99 (1994)
("My argument thus points to the replacement of claims about women as such or
even women in patriarchal societies with claims about women in particular con-
texts.").
171. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 170, at 39-41; Catharine A. MacKinnon, From Practice
to Theory, or What Is a White Woman Anyway?, 4 YALB J.L & FEMINISM 13, 15-22
(1991).
172. See, e.g., CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER, supra note 139, at 184, 274-76; MITCHELL
DUNEIER, SLIM'S TABLE: RACE, RFESPECTABILITY, AND MASCULINITY (1992);
GRISWOLD, supra note 139, at 252-54.
173. See generally SUSAN BROWNMiLLER, FEMININITY (1984); NANCY J. CHODOROW,
FEMININITIES, MASCULINITIES, SExuALiTIEs: FREUD AND BEYOND (1994).
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womanhood range, in traditional terms, from Eve to the Virgin Mary
and include many outright inconsistencies. 74 These variations are
important to feminist theory for many reasons. First, they sometimes
create a catch-22 in which women are damned no matter what they
do.1 5 Second, they sometimes create a tension through which a creative
reinterpretation can slip in, offering a new view of femininity.176 Finally,
they provide individual women with the opportunity to exercise some
selection among the variations, which allows them to design a model of
femininity with which they can live.
Once again, the same type of variation exists within the "main-
stream" model of masculinity. Here, too, the conventional pictures cover
an enormous range that includes numerous contradictions. Various
writers propose different typologies. Based on extensive interviews with
contemporary men, Kathleen Gerson discovered three general orienta-
tions toward masculinity. conventional breadwinners, "autonomous" men
who avoided the encumbrance of long-term partners and children, and
involved fathers with egalitarian spousal relationships.'" Exploring
cultural history, Barbara Ehrenreich argues that the 1950s endorsed a
single notion of masculinity-the Establishment Man committed to
work, wife, and children.'78 Since that time, however, different groups
of men-the Playboy movement, the Beatniks, "health care reformers,"
and others-have created new ideals of free and uncommitted masculini-
ties.'17 Focusing on ideal types, Mark Gerzon has proposed that tradi-
tional culture enshrined five types of masculinity-the Frontiersman, the
Soldier, the Breadwinner, the Expert, and the Lord-and contemporary
174. In these two roles, for example, woman is cast, on the one hand, as temptress and
source of physical sin and, on the other hand, as the symbol of spiritual purity.
175. Imagine, for example, the dilemma of the woman who asks the rapist who breaks
into her bedroom to wear a condom. If she adheres to the traditional model of
virtuous femininity and does not make this request, then she risks sexually transmit-
ted disease and an unwanted pregnancy. If, on the other hand, she does make the
request, then she may propel herself into the other traditional model of the promis-
cuous woman and later find it difficult to convince a prosecutor, judge, or jury that
she was in fact raped. See Carla M. da Luz & Pamela C. Weckerly, The Texas
'Condom-Rape' Case: Caution ConstruedAs Consent, 3 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S LJ. 95, 95
(1993).
176. See generally DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMMODATION: ETHICAL FEMINISM,
DEcONSTRUCTION, AND THE LAW 79-118 (1991).
177. GERSON, supra note 143, at 8-12, 23-37, 260-62, 274-75.
178. See BARBARA EHRENREICH, THE HEARTS OF MEN: AMERICAN DREAMS AND THE
FLIGHT FROM COMMITMENT 14-28 (1983).
179. See EHRENREICH, supra note 178, at 42-87.
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culture has juxtaposed to these a number of new types-the Healer, the
Companion, the Mediator, the Colleague, and the Nurturer.8 ' While all
of these writers propose different typologies, however, they all agree that
modern masculinity exhibits diversity, not uniformity.181
The men-as-beasts approach fails to grapple with the complexity and
inconsistency of gender identity. It avoids this complexity only by
abstracting from the actual circumstances in which such identities
operate, whether those circumstances involve the crosscutting influence
of other sorts of social oppression (like racism) or the myriad of social
contexts that emphasize one or another of the standard variations on
gender. By refusing to acknowledge these variations and inconsistencies,
the men-as-beasts approach contradicts the deep feminist commitment
to recognizing and accepting diversity. 2
b. Beastliness
The men-as-beasts claim has two parts: first, the idea that all men
are inherently, inescapably something; and second, the idea that the
thing they are is beastly. Up to this point, our arguments have been
directed primarily at the first aspect of the claim. The concerns about
agency and diversity that we have raised are primarily criticisms of the
first part of this claim. It is, however, important to explore the second
part of the claim as well. Obviously, not every criticism that takes the
form "all men are inherently and inescapably 'x'" is illegitimate. For
example, "all men breathe air" should be acceptable to feminists and
non-feminists alike. Which sorts of characteristics, when attributed to
180. See GERZON, supra note 143, at 13-45, 121-53, 217-29, 236-62.
181. See GRISWOLD, supra note 139, at 243-47, 268-69; ROTUNDO, supra note 75, at
286-87. More broadly, masculinity varies across history, see GRISWOLD, supra note
139; ROTUNDO, supra note 75, and across cultures, see DAVID D. GILMoRE, MAN-
HOOD IN THE MAKING: CULTURAL CONCEPTS OF MASCULINITY (1990).
182. It is logically possible to imagine a men-as-beasts theory that did not suffer from this
flaw. Such a theory would have to carefully and sensitively examine the multiple
masculinities constructed by various cultures, both the mainstream and the subgroups,
and conclude that they all shared some trait. In order for that trait to qualify as the
foundation for a wholesale condemnation of men as beasts, however, it would have
to be (1) extremely damaging, (2) applicable to broad areas of behavior, rather than
limited to very narrow circumstances, and (3) unbalanced by other more positive
traits. And all of these factors would have to hold true for every one of the cultural
variations examined, both across and within each subgroup. In the absence of such
a difficult proof, the men-as-beasts theory simply papers over the diversity and
complexity of gender roles.
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men in this essentialist way, violate feminist commitments and can
reasonably be called malebashing?
The arguments we have presented suggest that attributions of
inherent and inescapable sexism or patriarchy are unacceptable. Could
feminists, however, legitimately argue that while men can free themselves
from most of patriarchy, they nonetheless possess a single or small
number of inherent sexist characteristics? For example, men might be
convinced to adopt virtually all of the feminist agenda but still refuse to
see the need to compensate women for traditionally female work like
housekeeping. Is such a view of men malebashing?
In our opinion, the attribution of inherent sexist characteristics to
men might not be malebashing, but only if those characteristics are
peripheral to patriarchy and radically different from other sexist charac-
teristics. Feminists are not necessarily committed to the belief that
cultural or biological determinism does not exist, just that it does not
make patriarchy inevitable and gender equality impossible. If an ines-
capable male sexist characteristic is not to foreclose a non-sexist future,
it must have two features. First, the characteristic must be relatively
peripheral to patriarchy, however that concept is defined. If the charac-
teristic were central to patriarchy, then to that extent patriarchy would
be inevitable. Second, there must be a reason why this particular char-
acteristic is so completely determined (by culture or biology) when other
aspects of patriarchy are not. If the reasons for its determinism did apply
to other aspects of patriarchy, then, once again, feminist reform would
become impossible.
There is some tension between these two requirements and so the
number of characteristics that will satisfy both is likely to be very small.
If a characteristic is uniquely inescapable (thus satisfying the second
limit), one would expect it to be basic, foundational, or central to male
identity (thus violating the first requirement). But if feminism is to have
any impact, it must be able to change exactly such central or basic
characteristics. In other words, a feminist who believes that feminism can
make a difference in people's lives should avoid ascribing any significant-
ly patriarchal characteristics to men as inevitable and inescapable." 3
183. It is possible, of course, for a feminist to adopt the tragic view that complete gender
equality will never be achieved. If, however, feminism is to be a practical, political
movement, as most feminists seem to want, see, e.g., Joan E. Hartman & Ellen
Messer-Davidow, Introduction: A Position Statement, in (EN)GENDERING KNOWL-
EDGE: FEMINISTS IN ACADEME 1, 1, 5-6 (Joan E. Hartman & Ellen Messer-Davidow
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Therefore, the beastly characteristics that would qualify as
malebashing (if ascribed in an inevitable and inescapable way) are any
and all characteristics significantly related to patriarchy. Given how
broadly many feminists define patriarchy, this category could include
quite a lot. For example, feminists have argued that patriarchy is related
to male separateness,"8 4 violence, 8 5 domination, s6 capitalism, 8 7 milita-
rism,18 8 colonialism and economic exploitation,8 9 lack of respect for the
environment, 190 certain theological positions,' 9' particular conceptions of
science and rationality, 9 2 and much more. Nonetheless, some may argue
that an ascription of any negative personality trait qualifies as
malebashing. Shouldn't it be illegitimate to claim, for example, that all
men are inevitably and inescapably slobs, even if slovenliness is uncon-
nected to patriarchy?
The widely shared feniinist commitments we have discussed in this
section will not justify calling such a claim malebashing. Because we have
focused on the common concerns of a broad cross-section of feminist
theories, we have generated a definition of malebashing that centers on
eds., 1991), then some meaningful progress must be possible even if perfect equality
is unattainable.
184. See, e.g., NANCY J. CHODOROW, FEMINISM AND PSYCHOANALYTIC THEORY 148-49
(1989); Sandra Harding, Is Gender a Variable in Conceptions of Rationality?, 36
DIsarcA 225, 234 (1982).
185. See, e.g., Joan S. Meier, Notes From the Underground: Integrating Psychological and
Legal Perspectives on Domestic Violence in Theory and Practice, 21 HoPsTA L. REv.
1295, 1300 (1993); Michelle J. Anderson, Note, A License To Abuse: The Impact of
Conditional Status on Female Immigrants, 102 YALE L. J. 1401, 1421 (1993).
186. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 154, at 63-64, 67, 73-74.
187. See, e.g., Iris Young, Beyond the Unhappy Marriage: A Critique of the Dual Systems
Theory, in WOMEN AND REVOLUTION: A DISCUSSION OF THE UNHAPPY MARRIAGE OF
MARxISM AND FEMINISM 43, 58 (Lydia Sargent ed., 1981).
188. See, e.g., BErY A. REARDON, SEXISM AND THE WAR SYSTEM 14 (1985); Ann Scales,
Militarism, Male Dominance, and Law: FeministJuriprudence as Oxymoron?, 12 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 25, 26 (1989).
189. See, e.g., Chandra Talpade Mohanty, Introduction: Cartographies of Struggle, in THRD
WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS oF FEMINISM 14-15 (Chandra Talpade Mohanty
et al. eds., 1991).
190. See, e.g., Josephine Donovan, Animal Rights and Feminist Theory, in EcOmnMINISM
167, 174-81 (Greta Gaard ed., 1993); MARIA MIES & VANDANA SHIVA,
EcOFEMINISM 2-3, 14-15 (1993).
191. See, e.g., Joanne Carlson Brown & Rebecca Parker, For God So Loved the World?, in
CHRISTIANITY, PATRIARCHY AND ABUSE: A FEMINIST CRITIQUE 1, 3 (Joanne Carlson
Brown & Carole R. Bohn eds., 1989) (discussing original sin and perpetual virgini-
ty).
192. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 154, at 64-68.
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issues of gender hierarchy rather than on the many other issues that
some, but not all, of these theories would share. We believe that this
definition is sufficient to provide a useful critique of certain criticisms of
men and is all the more powerful because of its very broad base. For
these reasons, the definition in this section can stand on its own.
It is possible, however, to develop the definition further by turning
to theories concerned with the nature of a respectful dialogue, including
some feminist theories. This move narrows the foundation of the criti-
cism in terms of the number of feminists who subscribe to its assump-
tions, but at the same time it broadens the foundation by exploring the
reasons that certain conceptions of agency are unacceptable independent
of the feminist commitment to gender equality. In so doing, it provides
a more general standard for malebashing, disconnected from the partic-
ular concern of gender hierarchy. This more developed definition is the
subject of the next subsection.
B. Discourse Norms
We base our model of malebashing not only on basic feminist values
but also on general discourse norms. In particular, to carry on a persua-
sive and non-oppressive dialogue, participants must exhibit moral respect
for one another, across difference. Such respect, in our view, requires
recognition of both (1) the general capacity for self-determination shared
by all humans and (2) the individual and varying life circumstances of
different interlocutors. We make this argument from two sets of norms:
commonsense notions of dialogic communication and formal discourse
ethics.
1. Dialogic Communication
The following propositions are relatively uncontroversial. First,
scholarly journals and especially law reviews serve essentially dialogic
functions. One of the more important of these functions is persuasion:
the writer seeks to persuade his/her readership of his/her views, and then
readers seek to rebut or modify those views, also by persuasion. Second,
scholarly journals do not or should not serve antidialogic functions, i.e.,
writers should not knowingly engage in misleading political propaganda.
Third, other fora may serve other functions, i.e., the purpose of a
political rally is not the same as the purpose of a law review article.
Fourth, the purpose of a forum generates some forum-specific norms for
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proceeding, i.e., applause may be appropriate at a concert but not a
funeral. Fifth, men as well as women read scholarly journals and partici-
pate in the dialogue created therein. As a result, writers for such journals
should treat men and women as participants in a joint scholarly dialogue.
Those propositions, while fairly broad, have some important limits.
First, we do not mean to argue that academic journals are not or should
not be political; prescriptive argument is always, political. Rather, we
mean to claim that the politics of law reviews should be of a certain
kind-dialogic. Second, such dialogue need not appeal to notions of
objectivity or disembodied reason or unmediated truth. Rather, at least
one aim of prescriptive dialogue is the sharing, discussing, and mediation
of different and situated perspectives.'93 Third, while we claim that some
fora, like law reviews, rest on a dialogic ethos, we do not mean to claim
(nor do we mean to deny) that all political institutions need be modelled
on dialogic lines. 194
To claim that these propositions are uncontroversial, of course, is
not to say that they could not be controverted. In particular, some
radical feminists might argue that all social institutions rest on power,
not dialogue. As a result, contributions to (or interventions into) those
institutions should proceed from a strictly instrumental agenda. We offer
three responses to this argument. First, the feminists who make this
argument are making an argument; at least some of the time, they
attempt dialogically to persuade-or so they present themselves.'"
Second, as we have argued above, feminism must take as one of its aims
the persuasion of those with different perspectives. If dialogue is to occur
anywhere, scholarly journals, with their internal dialogic ethos, are very
193. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term, Foreword: Justice Engendered,
101 HRv. L. Rav. 10 (1987).
194. We base these claims about the dialogic function of academic journals on the shared
understanding of those who contribute to them. We do not know of any focussed
study exploring this understanding. As a result, we can only appeal to the self-
understanding of those who read this article (readers of and writers for law reviews)
and to the purpose evident in every scholarly article that we have ever read: dialogic
persuasion. We believe, however, that this appeal is not controversial.
195. Catharine MacKinnon furnishes a good example. She argues that social reality rests
primarily, perhaps exclusively, on power relations. Gender, in particular, is not about
sex but about power. See MAcKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED,
supra note 53, at 46, 52. And yet one of MacKinnon's primary political activities is
analytical writing about the construction of gender. In addition, in conferences she
often self-consciously seeks to invite dialogue among participants. See MAcKINNoN,
Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 46, 46-47. Plainly,
she hopes that her analysis will dialogically persuade us to change power relations.
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likely candidates. And indeed, across the spectrum, many feminists
denounce a non-dialogic form of communication as stereotypically and
oppressively "masculine." 196 Third, a contributor to a journal may, of
course, choose to disregard dialogic norms. There is no law imposing
such norms on the participants; only the self-understanding of the
participants does that. But to ignore dialogic norms is nonetheless to
violate the internal ethos of the institution. A certain form of that
behavior, when directed at men, may legitimately be described as
"malebashing."
If one accepts the claim that scholarly writing is dialogue, the
reasons for our model of malebashing become apparent. The purpose of
a normative dialogue across difference is to express, discuss, and per-
suade. Such a purpose implies a certain status for the participants. First,
they must be able to change in response to the dialogue; they cannot be
beasts by nature. Otherwise, the dialogue is pointless. Second, their
individual life circumstances matter; they must be able to bring their
own perspectives to the discussion and have those perspectives recog-
nized. They cannot, in other words, all be assimilated to a stereotypical
image, such as the Universal Conspirator or the Great Whore. Other-
wise, the dialogue is not a dialogue-or at least not a dialogue between
actual persons, as opposed to a dialogue between images. Those two
claims can be understood as demands of respect. To respect an interloc-
utor, one must seek to understand how and why that speaker's perspec-
tive differs from one's own, and to acknowledge the interlocutor's ability
to modify his/her conduct, desires, etc., as a result of discussion. Without
respect, dialogue is impossible. It becomes simply an exercise in solipsism
or power.
Notice that this argument does not assert that men are not beasts
by nature or universal conspirators. Rather, it asserts that in dialogue,
one cannot treat one's interlocutors as such. It is inconsistent with the
nature of the discussion to portray men in either of the ways that we
have described. Indeed, if one really believed that men were Beasts by
Nature or Universal Conspirators, it is unclear why one would bother
writing about it in academic journals, as opposed to other, more active
interventions. To enter the world of scholarly commentary at all is to
believe in the possibility of persuasion and therefore to attribute a certain
status to one's readership.
196. See infra text accompanying notes 218-65 (discussion of Habermasian feminists);
MAcKINNON, Desire andPower, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 46, 52;
Suzanna Sherry, Civic Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication,
72 VA. L. REv. 543 (1986).
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Again, these strictures seem to us to be relatively uncontroversial,
even if they are not always honored. And again, we should stress the
limits of our argument. First, we do not mean that in dialogue one must
be passionless or polite or even civil. Second, we do not mean that all
perspectives are entitled to equal weight on all issues. Rather, we mean
only that treating all members of a group as if they shared exactly the
same perspective is disrespectful. Third, we do not mean that it is wrong
to make generalizations about gender. Rather, we mean only that one
must be prepared to recognize variations from those generalizations.
Finally, the parameters that we have constructed set up a very broad
continuum of acceptable theories of agency. On the one hand, while
participants must possess enough agency to change in response to the
discussion, much may still be heavily determined by social or biological
structure, and they need not possess anything like metaphysical free will.
Indeed, all that is really necessary is the capacity for reflexive media-
tion-the ability self-consciously to reflect on the forces (like dialogue)
conditioning one.'97 The appropriate, the necessary, attitude toward
agency is belief in the capacity to respond to dialogue.
On the other hand, we enter into dialogue because we believe we
can learn from the different perspectives of others. In other words, we
are limited by circumstances; we cannot each see everything from our
own situation. Our perceptions, and therefore our identities, are in part
a product of social and biological structure, not just attributes freely
chosen by a rational intelligence out of a transparent world. The appro-
priate, the necessary, attitude is patient recognition that humans are
finite creatures limited by circumstance.
Those two claims together amount only to a clichd in late twentieth
century thought: we are in part a product of our circumstances and in
part a product of our own choices. That clichd rules out only the
extremes of the agency continuum: complete transcendent free will and
complete determinism without the possibility of self-reflection. There is,
however, no absolute or bright line demarcating the poles. In this sense,
this discourse norm-like any discourse norm-must function not as a
determinate rule but as a regulative ideal. At some point on this contin-
197. Indeed, it is even possible to concede that the dialogue itself may be nothing more
than one force among others conditioning the individual, and the individual chooses
among those forces based on some congerie of other conditioning forces. All that is
necessary is that the dialogue can have some effect; the individual (however constitut-
ed-as free or as a product of circumstances) can reflect on the dialogue and change
accordingly.
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uum, as one approaches the poles, negative statements about men
effectively deny men participation in the dialogue, by denying either
their agency or their perspective to an excessive degree. When that
happens, we have strayed into the territory of malebashing.
2. Discourse Ethics
We have based the preceding analysis on a commonsense appeal to
the self-understanding of law review contributors. The work of discourse
ethicists allows us to formulate these claims in a more formal and
rigorous way. Jiirgen Habermas is perhaps the preeminent discourse
theorist, but we rely primarily on the work of writers who have modified
Habermas' theories to reflect feminist insights.
a. Habermas
Habermas seeks to ground the legitimacy of government in an "ideal
speech situation"-a practical discourse carried on under certain ideal
conditions. 9 ' In particular, the ideal speech situation rests upon
reflexivity (the ability of each participant to question and to criticize),199
and upon symmetry conditions (the ability of each participant to employ
different speech acts, such as contesting, prescribing, reconceptualizing,
or moving to different levels of discourse)." 0 In Habermas' view, the
great benefit of this speech situation is that it allows the better argument
to prevail of its own weight; power will not determine who participates
or which claims are accepted.2' Through this speech situation, we can
move beyond "normatively ascribed" forms of social ordering (forms that
198. JORGEN HABERMAs, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,
in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE AcrION 41, 88 (Christian Lenhardt
& Shierry Weber Nicholsen trans., MIT Press 1990) (1983).
199. See Jorgen Habermas, Moral Development and Ego Identity, in COMMUNICATION AND
THE EVOLUTON OF SOCIETY 93 (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1979)
(1976).
200. See JUrgen Habermas, Towards a Theory of Communicative Competence, 13 INQUIRY
360, 371-72 (1970) [hereinafter Habermas, Communicative Competence].
201. See Habermas, Communicative Competence, supra note 200, at 371-72; JORGEN
HABERmAs, LEGIMATION CIsIs 110 (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1975) (1973)
[hereinafter HABERmAs, LEGrnMATION CRisis]. See also Nancy S. Love, Ideal Speech
and Feminist Discourse: Habermas Re-Visioned, 11 WOMEN & POL. 101, 113 (1991);
Lorenzo C. Simpson, On Habermas and Particularity: Is There Room for Race and
Gender on the Grassy Plains of Ideal Discourse?, 6 PRAXIs INT'L 328, 330 (1986).
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unreflexively rely upon a cultural tradition) to "communicatively
achieved" forms (forms that are the product of ideal discourse).202
Habermas and other discourse ethicists ascribe enormous philo-
sophical significance to the concept of the ideal speech situation.
Habermas himself seeks to find in it a legitimate basis for government.
His defense of the ideal speech situation, moreover, is
semitranscendental: to begin a dialogue about norms, we must believe
that consensus is possible, and consensus is possible only "under condi-
tions that neutralize all motives except that of cooperatively seeking
truth."2 3 As a result, the concept of the ideal speech situation is inherent
in the pragmatics of language. Seyla Benhabib believes that the ideal
speech situation can provide not only a theory of governmental legiti-
macy but also "a universalist and postconventionalist perspective on all
ethical relations: it has implications for familial life no less than for the
democratic legislatures."" 4 Rejecting transcendentalism, Benhabib seeks
to ground communicative ethics not in the pragmatics of language but
in the (admittedly historical and contingent) "moral presuppositions of
the cultural horizons of modernity''2°5 arrived at through the "processual
generation of reasonable agreement about moral principles via an open-
ended moral conversation."206
For our present purposes, we need ascribe no such pervasive signif-
icance to discourse norms. Rather, we look to discourse theory only to
answer the following question: in a forum (like scholarly journals) the
purpose of which is discourse, what norms will best advance that pur-
pose? Accordingly, we need not rely on communicative ethics to provide
legitimacy for government or substance to ethical life. Nor need we make
discourse norms a regulative ideal for all political fora or social integra-
tion as a whole. Other fora may reflect other patterns of proceeding, and
those patterns may produce important truths. But discourse serves
important ends as well. We wish now to consider how it best does so,
how it generates claims to which we should give some normative weight.
202. JORGEN HAwIRwvAs, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 70 (1984) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION].
203. HABERMAS, COMMUNICATIVE ACTION, supra note 202, at 19. See alo SEYLA
BENHABIB, SITUATING THE SELF: GENDER, COMMUNITY AND POSTMODERNISM IN
CONTEMPORARY ETHics 29-30 (1992). But cf. Marie Fleming, The Gender of Critical
Theory, 13 CULTURAL CRITIQUE 119, 132 (1989).
204. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 39.
205. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 30.
206. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 37.
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Habermas has proved attractive to a number of feminist writers, for
good reasons. His belief in the intersubjective construction of the self,2 °7
his hope for a discursive rather than monological form of political
reasoning, 20 and his conviction that the women's movement-virtually
alone among modern political movements-offers a genuinely
emancipatory and nondefensive program,20 9 all mesh with feminist values
and commitments.
On the other hand, Habermas also retains certain con-
cepts-especially universalizing reason-traditionally associated with
patriarchal liberalism. Habermas argues that practical discourse may take
cognizance only of generalizable interests, defined thus: "all affected can
fteely accept the consequences and the side effects that the general
observance of a controversial norm can be expected to have for the
satisfaction of the interests of each individual."' Practical discourse may
formulate a norm based on such a generalizable interest, because it
proceeds from consensus. Habermas exiles more particular interests,
however, from his practical discourse. They are not part of the domain
of justice, or 6f public morality. They must find a home in the private
sphere or in aesthetic-expressive discourses,"' because they are
intersubjectively irreconcilable. 12
Feminists may initially suspect such reliance on universalizing reason
and the public/private distinction because of the historical pedigree of
those concepts. Traditionally, much political theory associated reason and
the public sphere with men, and affectivity and the private sphere with
women. 1 Habermas intends no such association, however, and there is
no reason that we should not take him at his word. He believes men and
women should participate equally in the ideal speech situation. Yet at the
207. See Love, supra note 201, at 114.
208. See Isaac D. Balbus, Habermas and Feminism: (Male) Communication and the Evolu-
tion of (Patriarchal) Society, 13 NEw PoL. Sci. 27, 31 (1984); Fleming, supra note
203, at 131; Iris Marion Young, Impartiality and the Civic Public, in FEMINISM AS
CITIQUE 57, 68 (Seyla Benhabib & Drucilla Cornell eds., 1987).
209. See Love, supra note 201, at 111; Nancy Fraser, What's Critical About Critical
Theory?, in FEMINISM AS CRITIQUE, supra note 208, at 49.
210. JORGEN HABERMAS, Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical Justification,
in MORAL CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATvE ACTION, supra note 198, at 41, 93.
211. See Fleming, supra note 203, at 135 (citing SEYLA BENHABIB, CRITIQUE, NoRM AND
UTOPIA: A STUDY OF THE FOUNDATIONS or CRITIcAL THEORY 338-39 (1986)).
212. See HABERMAS, LEGITIMATION CRISIS, supra note 201, at 108. See also Simpson, supra
note 201, at 330.
213. See Young, supra note 208, at 64.
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same time Habermas ignores the gender subtext of this claim. Even if
women could theoretically participate in the public sphere, under present
circumstances they face significant material obstacles to doing so.
Habermas completely fails to recognize the importance of this fact.' 4
Suppose, however, that we could purge Habermas of all of these
problems; suppose that we could imagine a public sphere that proved
equally accommodating to men and women in their use of universalizing
reason. Many feminists would still reject such a model of public life, on
the grounds that moral judgment must refer not only to the universal
but also to the particular and contextual. To abstract away details is to
lose relevant moral information about the moral context. Drawing
heavily on the work of Carol Gilligan,1 5 these writers have argued that
moral life involves two "voices" or ethics. One, the stereotypically
masculine voice, takes as the central moral problem "how to resolve the
competing claims of unrelated individuals pursuing autonomous courses
of action."21 The answer to this problem is universalizing reason, with
its apparatus of abstraction, autonomy, and justice rather than the good
life; in short, an ethic of justice and rights. The other voice, the
stereotypically feminine one, is an ethic of care and responsibility. This
voice takes as the central moral problem how to maintain and create
connection and communication among persons and to satisfy the needs
of particular individuals. 2 The answer to this problem must be contex-
tual and narrative, with concern for and awareness of the particular
persons involved.
b. A Feminist Reconstruction of Habermas
A number of feminist writers have sought, explicitly or implicitly,
to bring Gilligan and Habermas together.21 8 Among these, Seyla
Benhabib has produced perhaps the most substantial and detailed body
of work. 9 In Benhabib's view, for discourse to yield morally significant
results, it must be "an actual dialogue among actual selves who are both
'generalized others,' considered as equal moral agents, and 'concrete
214. See Fraser, supra note 209, at 42-56.
215. See GILuGAN, supra note 49.
216. Balbus, supra note 208, at 29.
217. See, e.g., Balbus, supra note 208, at 30.
218. See, e.g., BENHABIB, supra note 203; Fraser, supra note 209; Young, supra note 208.
219. See BENHABIB, supra note 203.
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others,' that is individuals with irreducible differences." 220 Corresponding
to this claim that in dialogue we are both "generalized" and "concrete"
others, Benhabib proposes two substantive discourse norms: first, "we
ought to respect each other as beings whose standpoint is worthy of equal
consideration (the principle of universal moral respect [for generalized
others]) ..., ;221 second, "[w]e ought to treat each other as concrete
human beings whose capacity to express this standpoint we ought" to
enhance by creating, whenever possible, social practices embodying the
discursive ideal (the principle of egalitarian reciprocity [for concrete
others]). 222
i. The Generalized Other
In the standpoint of the generalized other, Benhabib seeks to retain
some of Habermas' attachment to universalism:
The standpoint of the generalized other requires us to view
each and every individual as a rational being entitled to the
same rights and duties we would want to ascribe to ourselves.
In assuming the standpoint, we abstract from the individuality
and concrete identity of the other .... [W]hat constitutes his
or her moral dignity is not what differentiates us from each
other, but rather what we, as speaking and acting rational
agents, have in common. 22
3
Traditional moral and political philosophy may find Benhabib's refusal
to disavow universalism to be the most congenial part of her thinking,
but for reasons that we have already discussed, many feminists may find
it the most suspect. It is important, therefore, to stress that Benhabib's
universalism is very different from that of, say, Kant 224 or even Rawls.
225
Perhaps most importantly, Benhabib emphatically denies that
universalism is the sum total of moral and political philosophy.226 The
function of the generalized standpoint is thus not to exile "non-universal"
facts or phenomena-emotions, conceptions of the good life, needs,
220. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 169.
221. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 31.
222. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 31.
223. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 158-59.
224. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 161-64.
225. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 161-70.
226. See BENHABIB, supra note 203.
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values, particular circumstances-from public discussion.227 Indeed, the
dialogue that Benhabib has in mind is radically open, without reliance
on any of the traditional binary oppositions. Benhabib's universalism
thus does not derive from a distrust of nature, passion, Woman, or
particularity.228
Instead, Benhabib's universalism seeks only to promote respect for
persons, to recognize universal moral personhood. The function of the
generalized standpoint is essentially discursive: "All argumentation entails
respect for one's conversation partners; such respect belongs to the idea
of fair argumentation; to be a competent partner in such a conversation
then entails recognizing the principle of equal respect."'229 Equal respect
is thus a presupposition of dialogue, in that "communicative ethics sets
up a model of moral conversation among members of a modern ethical
community for whom the theological and ontological bases of inequality
among humans have been radically placed into question."230 Members of
such a community may theoretically challenge the principle of equal
respect, but they must convince the other members of their point of
view, in a conversation conducted according to the principle of equal
respect. We may, in other words, hypothetically examine the principle,
but we cannot suspend it.231' The target of Benhabib's universalism is
thus not the emotional, the particular, or the female, but the "racist, the
sexist, or the bigot," who would argue that "some individuals on account
of certain characteristics should be effectively excluded from the moral
conversation." 23
2
This discursive norm of equal respect precludes the view, discussed
above, that men are beasts-whether as a result of biology or inevitable
social conditioning. That claim quite drastically denies them the status
of a generalized other. Beasts lack rationality, agency, moral competence,
and moral dignity. That claim denies any commonality between men and
women. There is no point in speaking to them, because they cannot
behave otherwise. There is no point in listening to them, because they
can only voice the verities imposed on them by genes or society. They
are an entirely unequal class that "on account of certain characteristics
227. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 50-51.
228. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 26, 50-51.
229. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 31.
230. BENHAMIB, supra note 203, at 32.
231. See BENHABM, supra note 203, at 32-33.
232. BENHlAMB, supra note 203, at 32-33.
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should be effectively excluded from the moral conversation."233 One
might hold the view that men are beasts, but not in an open discursive
forum. In such a forum one could theoretically examine such a notion,
but it must quickly be rejected as inconsistent with the "pragmatic rules
necessary to keep the moral conversation going .... ",234 In short, from
the standpoint of discourse theory, the view that men are beasts must be
rejected as malebashing.
ii. The Concrete Other
While Benhabib seeks to retain some of Habermas' universalism, she
denies it is the whole of moral and political philosophy. She explains:
"The standpoint of the concrete other ... requires us to view each and
every rational being as an individual with a concrete history, identity and
affective-emotional constitution."3 5 As concrete other, we must each seek
to "comprehend the needs of the other, his or her motivations, what she
searches for, and what s/he desires,"236 and correspondingly we may each
expect to "feel] recognized and confirmed as a concrete, individual being
.... ,,27 Traditional political philosophers may be relatively uncomfort-
able with this contextualism, but many modern feminists may find it the
most congenial part of Benhabib's thinking.
As for the generalized other, Benhabib's justification for the stand-
point of the concrete other is essentially dialogic. Importantly, Benhabib
means her discourse norms to apply in actual, real-world conversations.238
She does not intend that lonely moral philosophers should engage in an
internal dialogue or thought experiment that vaguely resembles a conver-
sation. 39 Her discourse model may set substantive limits on the out-
comes of various discourses (i.e., we may not violate the conditions
necessary to continue the dialogue, such as universal respect and egalitari-
an reciprocity), but the discourses themselves must be concrete and
contextual; the theoretical model of discourse alone will not generate
answers. 240 In short, moral discourses are nothing more than "the
233. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 33.
234. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 32.
235. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 159.
236. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 159.
237. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 159.
238. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 169.
239. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 24.
240. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 34-37, 53-55.
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continuation of ordinary moral conversations in which we seek to come
to terms with and appreciate the concrete others' point of view." '241
If moral discourses are actual discourses, then as participants in such
dialogues, we are always and simultaneously both generalized and
concrete others.242 To ignore that we are concrete others would be to
abandon the dialogic ideal, for several reasons. First, we learn and use the
skills and habits necessary for all moral conversation in concrete settings
with concrete interlocutors. There is simply no such thing as a general-
ized conversation:
In conversation, I must know how to listen, I must know how
to understand your point of view, I must learn to represent to
myself the world and the other as you see them. If I cannot
listen, if I cannot understand, and if I cannot represent, the
conversation stops, develops into an argument, or maybe never
gets started. Discourse ethics projects such moral conversations,
in which reciprocal recognition is exercised, onto a utopian
community of humankind. But the ability and the willingness
of individuals to do so begins with the admonition of the
parent to the child: "What if others threw sand in your face or
pushed you into the pool, how would you feel then?"243
Second, a dialogue among generalized others is not a dialogue at all,
because generalized others are really all the same person. By definition,
they share all the same qualities-reason, universal rights, etc.-and they
have no other characteristics. For this reason, Benhabib denies that
Rawls' original position2 44 is a discourse model of political philosophy:
If all that belongs to them as embodied, affective, suffering
creatures, their memory and history, their ties and relations to
others are to be subsumed under the phenomenal realm, then
what we are left with is an empty mask that is everyone and no
241. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 52.
242. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 164.
243. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 52-53.
244. The original position is an imaginary device proposed by Rawls to generate rules of
justice. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 11 (1971). The members of the
original position are behind a "veil of ignorance," i.e., they do not know about the
individual situation in society. RAWLS, supra, at 12. As a result, according to Rawls,
they can develop evenhanded rules of justice without self-interest clouding their
judgment. See RAwLs, supra, at 12. To determine rules of justice, therefore, we
should ask what rules people would adopt in the original position. See RAWLS, supra,
at 11-12.
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one.... In Kantian moral theory, moral agents are like geo-
metricians in different rooms who, reasoning alone for them-
selves, all arrive at the same solution to a problem. Following
Habermas, I want to name this the "monological" model of
moral reasoning.24
5
Third, Kantian/Rawlsian universalism of this sort suppresses crucial
relevant moral information about persons. Because people in the original
position are all the same person, they cannot engage in a conversation,
but they can engage in "the silent thought process of a single self who
imaginatively puts himself in the position of the other .... -211 Accord-
ing to Rawls, Kant, and Kohlberg, that thought process is "the most
adequate form of moral judgment."247 Benhabib radically denies this
claim, on the ground that people in the original position lack the
necessary information to perform this thought process. Such people are
without ends, conceptions of the good, or human ties:
At this point we must ask whether the identity of the human
self can be defined with reference to its capacity for agency
alone. Identity does not refer to my potential for choice alone,
but to the actuality of my choices, namely to how I, as a finite,
concrete, embodied individual, shape and fashion the circum-
stances of my birth and family, linguistic, cultural and gender
identity into a coherent narrative that stands as my life's
story.... The self is not a thing, a substrate, but the protago-
nist of a life's tale. 248
As a result, we cannot judge moral situations without full information
about the context and the actors, and people in the original situation do
not have that kind of information:
Can moral situations be individuated independently of our
knowledge of the agents involved in these situations, of their
histories, attitudes, characters and desires? Can I describe a
situation as one of arrogance or hurt pride without knowing
something about you as a concrete other? Can I know how to
distinguish between a breach of confidence and a harmless slip
245. BNHAmiB, supra note 203, at 161, 163.
246. BENRABIB, supra note 203, at 163.
247. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 163.
248. BENAB, supra note 203, at 161-62.
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of the tongue, without knowing your history and character?
Moral situations, like moral emotions and attitudes, can only
be individuated if they are evaluated in light of our knowledge
of the history of the agents involved in them.
249
[In the original position, i]nstead of thinking from the stand-
point of all involved, that is instead of reversing perspectives
and asking ourselves "what would it really be like to reason
from the standpoint of a black welfare mother?" we are simply
asked to think what distribution of material goods would be
most rational and reasonable to adopt, if we did know in a
general way that our society is such that one may be a black
welfare mother of three children out of wedlock living in a
rapidly decaying urban neighborhood. There is no moral
injunction in the original position to face "the otherness of the
other," one might even say to face their "alterity," their irre-
ducible distinctness and difference from the self 250
If we take individuals seriously as concrete others, then we cannot
adopt the view that men are universal conspirators. That view reduces
men, in all their variability, contextuality, and multiplicity, into a single
generalized other with only one set of characteristics: (1) he (not they,
for there is effectively only one) self-consciously desires to promote the
interests of men as a class; (2) he self-consciously seeks to oppress women
in order to do so; and (3) he self-consciously conspires with other men
to promote these ends. Claiming that all men conspiratorially seek to
promote the patriarchy through the oppression of women fails utterly to
"view each and every rational being as an individual with a concrete
history, identity and affective-emotional constitution." 251 Some women
may experience men as universal conspirators, and that experience is
important. At the same time, in discourse, "I must learn to represent to
myself the world and the other as you [the alleged universal conspirator]
see them. If I cannot listen, if I cannot understand, and if I cannot
represent, the conversation stops, develops into an argument, or maybe
never gets started."252
249. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 162-63.
250. BENHaBIB, supra note 203, at 166-67 (citation omitted).
251. BENHMIB, supra note 203, at 159.
252. BENaMIB, supra note 203, at 52.
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Moreover, like selves in the original position, universal conspirators
are "defined with reference to [their] capacity for agency alone."253 Men
have will, power, and the capacity for choice. Since women are op-
pressed, men-as a class, a conspiracy-must be the oppressors. But, as
Benhabib points out:
Identity does not refer to my potential for choice alone, but to
the actuality of my choices, namely to how I, as a finite,
concrete, embodied individual, shape and fashion the circum-
stances of my birth and family, linguistic, cultural, and gender
identity into a coherent narrative that stands as my [particular]
life's story.
25 4
To ignore the particularity of each man is malebashing.
iii. Feminism and Deontology
Benhabib describes her communicative ethics as deontological. 25
Traditionally, deontological theories have served to exile women and the
concerns of women from serious discussion, through a series of binary
oppositions-public over private, justice over the good life, reason over
emotion. For this reason, many feminists have come to distrust
deontological theories. 25 Benhabib's theory is, however, deontological in
the weakest possible sense. In so describing her theory, Benhabib means
only that her discourse model itself, principally in its norms of universal
respect and egalitarian reciprocity, constrains outcomes. 257 One may not
deny an interlocutor fundamental personhood or refuse to recognize
his/her concrete individuality. Otherwise, the discourse should proceed
under no constraints. In particular, Benhabib recognizes that
deontological theories have traditionally excluded women through binary
oppositions, and she argues that discourse should address public and
private, justice and the good life, reason and emotion alike.258
To be sure, some feminists who rely on Habermas argue for a
discussion that sounds more open, less constrained, than Benhabib's. We
suspect, however, that in practice they would not disagree with
253. BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 161.
254. BENHBIB, supra note 203, at 161-62.
255. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 73-76.
256. See, e.g., discussion of Young and Fraser supra text accompanying notes 211-17.
257. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 44, 73-76.
258. See BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 26, 50-52, 108-11, 155-62.
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Benhabib's central claim that the discourse must be respectful and
egalitarian. Thus, Iris Marion Young calls for a Habermasian discourse
that rejects the traditional dichotomies, a "heterogeneous public with
aesthetic and affective, as well as discursive, dimensions,"259 a public
dialogue that accepts the differences and particularities of individuals and
groups. 26° At the same time, Young maintains that any such public must
"include[ ] [a] commitment to equality and mutual respect."2 61 Similarly,
Nancy Fraser agrees with Benhabib about the importance of communica-
tively achieved contexts of interaction.262 Unlike Benhabib, Fraser
emphasizes that such contexts are the product of political struggle,2 63
based on an "ethic of solidarity" discovered among specific individuals
and groups. 264 She agrees with Habermas (and Benhabib), however, that
all interlocutors must be equal in the discourse: "In so far as Habermas's
endorsement of universalism pertains to the metalevel of access to and
control over the means of interpretation and communication it is well
taken. At this level, women's struggle for autonomy can be understood
in terms of a universalist conception of distributive justice."265
A feminist discourse, in short, must honor the constraints of respect
and equality. A feminist discourse must recognize that denunciation of
men as beasts or universal conspirators is malebashing and inconsistent
with the nature of the discourse itself. At the same time, however, a
feminist discourse insists only on the constraints of respect and equality.
It places no other limits on the discussion, so that within those con-
straints the discourse may range at will.
We have suggested that the argument based on feminist commit-
ments is largely independent of this argument based on discourse norms:
either framework can stand alone. Nonetheless, it is possible to see a
connection between these two approaches. The various feminist commit-
ments that we identified arise both from the underlying goal of gender
equality and from the practical realities of the political movement. Both
of these foundations can be understood in terms of discourse norms.
Political organization and reform in a democracy can, obviously, be seen
as an exercise in political dialogue. Less obviously, gender equality can
259. Young, supra note 208, at 59.
260. See Young, supra note 208, at 73-76.
261. Young, supra note 208, at 76.
262. See Fraser, supra note 209, at 53.
263. See Fraser, supra note 209, at 53-54.
264. Nancy Fraser, Toward a Discourse Ethic ofSolidarity, 5 PaWs INT'L 425, 429 (1986).
265. Fraser, supra note 209, at 54.
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also be seen in terms of respect for both women's rational agency and
their concrete experiences and identities. Using one or both of these
frameworks, it is possible to identify a small but meaningful category of
criticisms that could legitimately be called malebashing.
C. Hard Cases
Feminist commitments and discourse norms can both be used as
frameworks to define the concept of malebashing. Within both of these
frameworks, the two kinds of claims that we have identified, men-as-
beasts and universal conspiracy, are illegitimate and properly excluded
from the conversation. These claims qualify as malebashing because they
represent the poles on a continuum of agency. Both poles are unaccept-
able from within certain commitments of feminism and from the
perspective of dialogic norms generally. Claims that occupy these poles
are, therefore, definitionally and automatically malebashing because of
their content.
This definition of "polar" malebashing is fairly narrow, and a
narrow construction is entirely appropriate. To rule something "polar"
malebashing is to rule it dialogically out of bounds ab initio. Such
statements should not be made, nor need they be answered. This "show-
stopper" effect accurately describes how claims of malebashing tend to
function presently and one of our major purposes in this paper is to
argue that the class of claims that can legitimately be disposed of in this
way is extremely small. The only justification for cutting off the dialogue
in this way is that the narrowing norms are fundamental either to the
feminist project in general or to the dialogue itself. Thus, claims that fall
at the poles of this continuum of agency are properly dismissed as
malebashing, whereas claims between the poles must be considered,
discussed, and analyzed.
For example, to claim that men are beasts (or that women are
irrational) is beyond the dialogic bounds because it denies them agency.
But to claim that many or most or some men have abused women is not
polar malebashing, because this claim does not deny men the ability to
change. By the same token, even to claim that men have more of a
natural inclination to brutality than women is not polar malebashing, as
long as one also acknowledges that they have the ability to change in
response to such a challenge. Such a claim may be.wrong, ill-advised,
insulting, or pernicious, but it is not definitionally out-of-bounds.
As these examples suggest, however, most of the actual dialogue,
particularly in academic discussion, takes place in the intermediate range
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between the poles. If our norms had nothing to say about these "inter-
mediate" claims, then their function in actual conversations would be
limited. However, the concerns about agency that underlie our definition
of malebashing also have relevance to claims that fall between the poles.
Unlike polar malebashing, such intermediate claims cannot simply be
dismissed based on their clear facial content. Indeed, there may be no
clear answer to the question whether particular claims that fall between
the poles are malebashing, but the norms that we have suggested can
provide a framework for discussion of such claims.
Intermediate claims may violate the norms we have described in two
ways. First, we recognize that the dividing line between the poles and the
middle of the continuum will not always be clear. While some claims
will obviously be out of bounds, and some claims clearly will be safely
intermediate, 66 other claims may fall extremely close to the poles but not
clearly at them. Even if a claim is hedged so as to avoid a pole on the
continuum, it may be so close that it still raises concerns under these
norms. Thus, suppose a speaker says, "Almost all men are rapists at heart
and it takes truly exceptional and extraordinary circumstances for any
one of them to escape this fate." This claim leaves so little agency to
male listeners that it is not clear that it meets the requirements of either
a meaningful dialogue or an effective feminism. The important point is
that it is not clear. In other words, one could argue that the amount of
agency left is or is not sufficient for any of the dialogic or feminist
concerns raised in the previous subsections. This definition of
malebashing, then, admittedly contains a gray area in which people may
differ over whether a claim meets the suggested standard. Within that
gray area, this definition does not resolve the argument, but it does
suggest the appropriate issues for discussion.
Second, a claim that looks intermediate on its face may actually fall
at one of the poles because of the speaker's intent or the context or some
factor other than facial content. For example, suppose that a speaker
asserts that "[m]any men are inherently selfish," but winks and smiles
266. For example, the claim that men in modern American culture are trained to fear and
avoid connection is not malebashing. It neither states nor suggests that such training
is either inevitable or inescapable. Nor does it state or suggest that the training is the
result of some sort of conscious conspiracy. As we discuss in the text, men have an
obligation not to deflect the conversation constantly away from substantive feminist
concerns to consideration of their own agency. See infra text accompanying notes
272-75. At a minimum, this obligation means men may not assume the worst
possible interpretation of a claim regardless of how unlikely or unsupported.
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while saying the word "many." If the message in context is, "I really
mean all men," then the intonation and gestures have transformed an
otherwise intermediate claim into one that violates the norms concerning
agency. The point is simply that meaning is constructed from context,
speaker's intent, likely audience reception, and a variety of other factors
in addition to the facial content of a statement. Since our norms defining
malebashing concern the meaning of the statement, all of these factors
may be relevant. Therefore, even where the facial content is clearly
intermediate, other factors may move a claim to one of the poles.
The difficulty here is that these other factors are extremely complex
and highly context-specific. Unlike the facial content of a polar claim,
which is so extreme that it can be dismissed with little attention to
context,267 issues like motive, intonation, gestures, etc., must be assessed
in light of the particular situation in which they appear. While the
norms defined in the previous subsections plainly would be relevant to
such an assessment, it is not possible to lay down the sort of guidelines
that we were able to devise for content alone. Once again, the definition
offered would not resolve these cases, but it would highlight the issues
to be considered. The judgment whether a particular claim falls at one
of the poles on the agency continuum because of some factor other than
facial content is, necessarily, an ad hoc, highly contextual judgment. That
is why these are hard cases.
There is a subset of this class of hard cases that deserves somewhat
more detailed treatment. Suppose a speaker cites extremely high statistics
on some act of violence by men against women (e.g., ninety percent of
all men beat their wives or girlfriends) when she knows that those
numbers are false or is recklessly indifferent to their truth.268 The
substance of the claim itself is not malebashing under our definition; it
does not impute either too little or too much agency to men. Nonethe-
less, there is a strong argument that the speaker's motive violates the
norms we have discussed because her disregard for the truth of the
statistics suggests serious disrespect for the agency of her listeners.
267. Obviously, there are limits to such abstract analysis even in the case of facial content.
We have, from the outset, limited our discussion to a particular context (academic
dialogue) and to certain shared commitments (a basic agreement with feminism). We
do not mean to suggest that even content could be analyzed in complete abstraction,
only that the level of contextualization necessary to a satisfactory analysis increases
substantially when one moves from consideration of content alone to other factors,
such as motive or intonation.
268. We are grateful to Steve Heyman for pointing out this interesting example to us.
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The difficulty with this argument is that this disrespect for listeners,
while a violation of dialogic norms generally, is not malebashing in
particular because the disrespect applies to both male and female listen-
ers. If the speaker had knowingly cited false statistics about the poverty
rate or the destruction of the environment, she would exhibit exactly the
same disrespect toward her listeners, but we would not call it
malebashing. Malebashing, in other words, is a subset of the larger
category of dialogic disrespect: disrespect is malebashing only when the
disrespect is focused on men in particular.
We believe that the claim in the example is malebashing because of
the speaker's motive, but not because of her disrespect toward the
audience generally. When a speaker intentionally slanders a group, any
group, he or she is using that group as an object to manipulate the
audience. Thus, in addition to the disrespect to the audience, there is
also an independent denial of respect to the slandered group. One way
of understanding the disrespect is that the members of the vilified group
are treated as morally equivalent to objects rather than as persons.269
Treating people as objects by lying about them as a group violates
the feminist and dialogic norms we discussed in the previous subsections.
Such treatment violates the dialogic norms of recognizing both the
"generalized other," which demands equal respect for moral agency, and
the "concrete other," which demands respect for persons' specific con-
texts and life-experiences. Similarly, treating persons as objects based
simply on their gender violates some of the foundational commitments
of feminism. Such treatment denies or ignores as irrelevant people's own
accounts of their experiences. Moreover, this treatment denies or ignores
people's ability to reflect on and alter the gender identity that is given to
them: their membership in a particular gender group marks them out for
treatment as less than fully human, regardless of their own efforts or
desires to escape that gender identity. This dynamic, when applied to
women, is a large part of what feminism has struggled against. Gender
alone should not determine one's moral status in this way. Thus, this
sort of intentional misrepresentation is arguably malebashing because the
speaker's attitude toward the vilified group violates the defining norms
we have identified.
269. In this sense, malebashing is akin to hate speech. For an excellent discussion of how
hate speech generally denies the personhood, and therefore violates the rights of its
targets, see Steven J. Heyman, Introduction: Hate Speech and the Theory of Free
Expression, in HATE SPEECH AND THE CONSTITUTION iX, xl-lxvii (Steven J. Heyman
ed., 1996).
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"Hard" cases, then, can be hard either because they fall into the gray
area near the poles on the agency continuum or because they require
analysis of highly contextual factors like motive, intonation, and cir-
cumstance. The norms derived from feminist and dialogic commitments
do not provide clear categories to determine what is unacceptable in
these hard cases.27° Nonetheless, the norms provide the framework within
which the contextual and specific arguments about the legitimacy of such
an intermediate claim can take place.
D. Deflecting the Conversation
The norms defining malebashing both explain the exclusion of the
two poles on the agency continuum and help to analyze claims falling
between those poles. The broad applicability of these norms, however,
raises the specter that almost any claim about men by a feminist may be
met by a call to consider whether it violates these norms. We have said
that feminist claims about men cannot simply be dismissed as
malebashing unless they fall into the very limited area at the poles of this
continuum. But intermediate claims, even if they cannot be dismissed,
may be deflected by arguments about whether they also violate these
norms, arguments that the previous subsection suggests are a legitimate
subject for discussion. So, for example, a feminist who raises the issue of
male violence against women may find herself deflected to arguing about
male agency instead and her point about violence may never be heard or
addressed.
Such deflection is a very real danger because, for several reasons, it
is likely to be an attractive strategy even for men basically sympathetic
to feminism.27' First, this shift in the dialogue changes the emotional
valence in a way that may make it more comfortable for many men. The
270. The poles of the continuum are themselves such categories, available before discussion
and generated by the norms we discuss. Thus, the point in the text is just another
way of saying that these daims do not dearly fall into one of those poles.
271. There are, of course, some men who will take any opportunity to deflect or derail
feminist arguments. To the extent that our approach legitimizes this particular
method of deflection, it plainly gives aid and comfort to them as well. We are less
concerned about that than about the impact on discussions with less implacably
hostile men for two reasons. First, those who define themselves as the enemies of
feminism have plenty of other tools beside this one; we don't think we have added
meaningfully to their arsenal. Second, even without such deflection, feminist
arguments have relatively little chance of persuading this audience.
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feminist claim being deflected is, presumably, one that is uncomplimen-
tary to many, most, or all men. Such claims are often experienced by
male listeners as accusations of wrongdoing. The issue of male agency,
on the other hand, concerns possible wrongdoing by the speaker rather
than by the men who are her/his subjects. Thus, the shift in topic may
alter the emotional position of the men in the conversation from the
accused to the accuser. The best defense is a good offense.
Second, even men who do not feel personally accused, and therefore
are not experiencing an emotional need for defense, may simply find the
issue of male agency a more interesting topic than the substantive
criticism of men being offered by the feminist claim at issue. The issue
of male agency could be more attractive for a variety of reasons. This
question may well be more abstract and less empirical than the speaker's
subject (e.g., violence against women), which makes it easier to discuss
based simply on one's own analysis, i.e., no familiarity with any empirical
evidence is required. This issue may also be more detached from immedi-
ate experience than the speaker's claim and therefore easier to discuss
without strong and apparent emotional forces. The shift from a discus-
sion of male violence against women to one of male agency, for example,
might feel like a move to more emotionally neutral ground. The question
of male agency also connects very directly to larger issues of political,
moral, and epistemological theory that may be more interesting to many
men in academics.2 72
Given these strong incentives, the availability of this argument about
male agency may lead to a great deal of conversational deflection. We
consider this a very serious problem. The purpose of this article is to
help clear away the confusion, charges, and countercharges that discour-
age real discussion of feminist claims. If our definition of malebashing
and the norms that underlie it themselves generate roadblocks, then we
are contributing to the problem that we are attempting to solve. In order
to avoid this difficulty, some norms that create a duty to listen and
respond, rather than deflect, are necessary.
272. In addition, the issue of male agency is about men's own experience rather than
about women's experience of men. Perhaps because of our society's greater tolerance
for self-centeredness in men, many men may find it more comfortable to talk about
their own experiences. For a discussion of self-centeredness in men, see WILLARD
GAYLiN, THE MAI EGO (1992). There is an old cartoon in which a man and a
woman are at a restaurant, presumably on a first date, and the man is saying, "Well,
enough about me. Let's talk about what you think of me." We are simply pointing
out that talking about what you think of me is usually second-best to talking about
what I think of me.
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Our approach up to this point suggests that, when a feminist makes
a claim about men, it will often be the case that two different conversa-
tions would both be legitimate: one about the substance of the speaker's
claim and one about the image of male agency inherent in that claim. In
this situation, we need some guidance about which of these two conver-
sations should be pursued. When the claim clearly involves one of the
poles on the agency continuum, then, as we have suggested throughout,
it is appropriate for listeners to point this out and legitimate for them to
refuse to engage further with the claim. If, however, we are in one of the
intermediate, or "hard" cases, discussed above, then we believe that male
listeners have an obligation to defer consideration of the agency issues
and focus on the substance of the claim being made.
The source of this obligation is, quite simply, the power differential
between men and women throughout our society. Women are still
substantially underrepresented in positions of power, including within the
academy.273 Historically, men have had the power to control the agenda
and dominate the debate. As a result, women's voices, particularly
feminist voices, have often gone unheard. Men, therefore, have a special
obligation to make space for and cede some control to those who have
traditionally been excluded. As part of that obligation, men, including
male academics, have a prima facie duty not to deflect conversations
away from the substance of feminist arguments and toward issues of male
agency.
This duty has two parts. It means that men, who continue to
dominate the positions of gatekeeper and agenda setter in academic
dialogue, must help to ensure both that feminist arguments actually are
heard and that women are given meaningful control over the gateways
and agendas themselves. In other words, men in such conversations must
cede both time and control in order to redress the existing imbalance.
Deflecting a discussion from consideration of a substantive feminist issue
to an assessment of the speaker's alleged malebashing violates both parts
of this duty. It reduces (or eliminates) the time available for the feminist
claim to be heard and it places control of the agenda back in the hands
of the speaker's male interlocutors.
The duty we are proposing is not a punishment. The goal is not to
penalize men for past wrongdoing, but to correct a present injustice
273. See, e.g., Deborah J. Merritt & Barbara F. Reskin, The Double Minority: Empirical
Evidence of a Double Standard on Law School Hiring of Minority Women, 65 S. CAL.
L. REv. 2299 (1992); Deborah J. Merritt et al., Family, Place, and Career: The Gender
Paradox in Law School Hiring, 1993 Wis. L. REv. 395.
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(albeit one that has historical roots). The burden placed on men by this
duty is justified because it directly contributes to providing women with
the power and opportunity to be heard that they presently lack. More-
over, we are not proposing that any particular amount of time or
percentage of power should be transferred from men to women. 74 The
duty concerns the attitude of the male participants in the discussion
toward their female colleagues, particularly when those colleagues are
making critical claims. Thus, the duty is parallel to the obligation on
women not to malebash.
Remember, this obligation comes into play only when we are in the
intermediate range of claims rather than at the poles. In other words,
when a feminist makes a claim that may or may not violate the norms
defining malebashing-because of ambiguous contextual factors or
because it approaches but does not reach a pole-male listeners should
give her the benefit of the doubt, restrain any feelings of insult, and
listen to what she is saying. This obligation does not mean that concerns
about male agency raised by the claim can never be addressed, but it
does mean that such concerns should not be allowed to stand in the way
of an adequate opportunity to discuss the substance of the claim.
We do not believe that this is asking very much. The sort of self-
restraint and willingness to bear the marginal dignitary harms at issue
here is far less than that demanded of women every day by a pervasively
sexist culture. Arguments like the one here have been offered to justify
much more sweeping alterations in the principle of equal treatment.27 5
We are merely suggesting that people with privilege have an obligation
to be less concerned about the respect due to themselves and more
concerned about listening to those who have so often been denied
respect.
274. We do not address the question of whether these arguments might also justify a
demand for particular quantities of resources because we do not believe that such a
demand is necessary to deal with the particular problem of deflection that we are
considering. We intend to leave open the question of whether this sort of "quota"
might be justified as a solution to other aspects of the problem of group inequality.
In a sense the duty we propose is weaker than such a "quota," because it does not
guarantee any specific amount of time or power to women, but in another sense it
is stronger. There is no magic number of minutes (or pages in law reviews or female
deans) that is sufficient to dissolve the duty. The obligation to listen respectfully and
avoid deflection applies to every feminist claim, whether it is the first or the fiftieth.
275. See, e.g., Iris Marion Young, Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of
Universal Citizenship, 99 ETHics 250, 273 (1989) (advocating special rights for
oppressed groups and possible group veto power over certain legislation).
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E. Conclusion
Norms derived both from feminist commitments and from dialogic
theory provide a definition of malebashing. Under this definition,
malebashing occurs when a claim about men falls at the poles of the
continuum concerning male agency. Ascribing too little agency or too
much agency to men constitutes malebashing. If feminists do engage in
accusations that rely on unacceptable forms of agency and gender
identity, then it is justifiable to charge them with malebashing and to
believe that those accusations require no further response. If, conversely,
the criticisms voiced by feminists do not endanger these concerns, then
they do not qualify as malebashing. Such criticisms may be factually
wrong or strategically unwise, but they are not illegitimate. Regardless of
how critical such claims may be of men, they cannot be dismissed as
malebashing.
Between these relatively clear cases falls a range of claims that may
or may not violate the norms we have described. Some of these cases are
hard because the claim falls into a gray area on the continuum near the
poles; reasonable people may disagree over exactly how much agency is
enough (or too much). Some of the cases are hard because the meaning
of the claim depends on contextual factors like motive, intonation, and
circumstance. The norms we have described will not offer definitive
answers in many of these cases, but they provide a framework within
which such intermediate claims can be assessed.
When dealing with one of these intermediate claims, however, the
assessment of whether it constitutes malebashing must not be allowed to
deflect the conversation from the substance of the claim. Otherwise,
arguments about malebashing could largely obliterate serious consider-
ation of many feminist claims. Because of their privileged position in the
conversation, men generally have an obligation to avoid such deflection
and to listen and respond to the feminist argument made by the claim
at issue. In other words, men have an obligation to use their power to
open the dialogue to feminist claims rather than to close it.
SECTION FOUR: FEMINISM AND FEMINISMS
Throughout the previous section, we discussed feminist commit-
ments and theories as a whole. That focus may have created the impres-
sion that feminism is a unitary and coherent collection of theories. In
fact, there are many kinds of feminism and many points of sharp
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contention between them. We do not mean to minimize these differ-
ences or suggest that these areas of disagreement are unimportant. We
do, however, suggest that none of the most commonly held feminist
positions requires the type of claims that we have identified as polar
malebashing.
Some of those who accuse feminists of malebashing seem to believe
that one or more of these types of feminism are inherently or inescapably
committed to the extreme versions of male agency that we define as
polar malebashing" 6 In this Section, we show that all of the major types
of feminist theories are consistent with a rejection of these extreme views.
Notice that this claim is weaker than the one made in the previous
Section. We argued there that the feminist commitments and dialogic
norms identified require the rejection of the poles of the agency continu-
um. The various categories of feminist theory that we will identify in this
section, however, need not reject both of the extreme views of male
agency that we have defined as polar malebashing. All we are seeking to
show here is that none of these categories of theories requires such a view
of male agency. In other words, accepting the arguments made in the
previous Section does not commit one in advance to adopting or aban-
doning any particular brand of feminist theory. Regardless of the catego-
ry of feminist theory one adopts, if one is also committed to the feminist
themes or dialogic norms discussed earlier, then one can and should
reject polar malebashing. We briefly discuss four major categories of
feminist legal theories to illustrate this point: liberal feminism, cultural
or difference feminism, dominance or radical feminism, and
postmodernist feminism.277
It is not possible to discuss all of the feminist theorists, or even all
of the feminist legal theorists, in each of these four categories. Moreover,
any large scale examination of each school of feminist thought would
require an article of its own. Nonetheless, we do not wish to commit the
sin with which we charged Professor Lasson in Section Two-failing to
276. See supra text accompanying notes 5-14 (discussing Davidson) and 28-31 (discussing
Lasson).
277. Although every observer might draw the boundaries of these categories in slightly
different ways, the basic schema we will use is quite common. See, e.g., Patricia
Smith, Introduction, in FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE 4, 4-8 (Patricia Smith ed., 1993)
(describing liberal, relational, radical, and postmodern feminisms); MARY BECKER ET
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY
50-52 (1994) (describing liberal, dominance, and difference feminisms).
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examine the work of actual, particular feminists.27 We, therefore, choose
one theorist in each category and use her work to show why the assump-
tions that we believe to be representative of that category are consistent
with a rejection of malebashing as we have defined it.
We want to emphasize that this Section is not intended to be a
review of the feminist literature to see who, if anyone, is actually engaged
in malebashing. We do not wish to add to the name-calling and personal
attacks that so often characterize this discussion. Our focus is, instead,
on the theoretical frameworks that inform different feminist approaches
and the question whether any of them requires polar malebashing as we
have defined it. As a result, we do not intend to either indict or absolve
any particular feminist writer. Even with respect to the authors we
consider in detail, we are not warranting that every statement by these
feminist writers in every work they have written is free from polar
malebashing. We are arguing, instead, that the aspects of their work that
make them representative of a particular school of feminist theory do not
require that they describe male agency in a way that qualifies as polar
malebashing under our approach.
In addition, this Section addresses only polar malebashing and not
"hard" or intermediate claims. As we argued in the previous Section,
such intermediate claims can only be assessed in a highly contextual
analysis on a case-by-case basis.279 Thus, our argument here only con-
cerns the general theoretical commitments of various feminist frameworks
on the general issue of male agency.
A. Liberal Feminism
The first category of feminist theories is liberal feminism. Liberal
feminism is liberal in endorsing certain propositions about the relation-
ship between the individual and the state. One such proposition is that
what makes humans human is the individual capacity for rational choice.
Furthermore, each individual has the same capacity for rational choice.
Accordingly, the state should allow each individual to exercise that
capacity by protecting individual autonomy to the greatest extent com-
patible with a like autonomy in every other individual. ° Liberal femi-
278. See supra text accompanying notes 48-5 1.
279. See supra Section III.D.
280. See, e.g., ALISON M. JAGGAiz FEMINIST POLnCS AND HuMAN NATruRE 28-34 (1983)
[hereinafter JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLTrICS].
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nism is feminist in asserting that women possess the same capacity for
rational choice as men. Women should, therefore, receive the same
rights, autonomy, and opportunities for self-fulfillment.
28
'
Liberal feminism is also feminist in recognizing that, in fact, society
has not generally accorded these equal rights and opportunities to
women. Gender differences, among other things, may stand in the way
of such equality. In the view of liberal theorists, gender differences are
created by social role conditioning. Each individual has the same essential
human nature, but society trains men and women to be different
through a set of gender norms and expectations. 2 ' The goal of liberal
feminism is therefore to eliminate these gender roles, whether expressed
in law or other cultural mechanisms, and create an androgynous world,
in which each individual is free to develop as an individual.28 3
We will use a highly influential article by Wendy Williams as an
example of liberal feminism. In Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal
Treatment/Special Treatment Debate,284 Williams offers what she calls an
"equal treatment" approach to workplace rules governing pregnancy.285
She argues, against those of the left and the right who would single out
pregnancy for "special treatment," that "women affected by pregnancy,
childbirth or related medical conditions ... [should] be treated the same
for all employment related purposes ... as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work."286 The approach is thus
essentially comparative: pregnancy "creates needs and problems similar
281. See, e.g., JAGGAR, FEMINIST POLITICS, supra note 280, at 35-39.
282. See, e.g., CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER, supra note 139, at 33-34, 47-49; JAGGAR,
FEmINIST PoLITIcs, supra note 280, at 37-38, 193-94. The exact process by which
society imposes/encourages/creates these gender roles is often somewhat vague. See
CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER, supra note 139, at 47-50. It does seem clear,
however, that liberal feminists have departed from the most extreme liberalism in this
belief in social role conditioning. In their view, the individual is not just a presocial
substance with given wants, abilities, and desires; rather, identity is to some meaning-
ful extent created by socialization. Liberal feminists are still liberal, however, in
positing that the individual in some fundamental way exists apart from these roles
and is frustrated by them; that frustration is why liberation is so important. See
CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER, supra note 139, at 47, 53.
283. See, e.g., CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER, supra note 139, at 33-34, 49, 53; JAGGAR,
FEMINIST PoLrrscs, supra note 280, at 38-39, 176, 181.
284. Wendy Williams, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special
Treatment Debate, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 325 (1984).
285. Williams, supra note 284, at 325.
286. Williams, supra note 284, at 325 (quoting from the Pregnancy Discrimination Act).
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to those arising from causes other than pregnancy."287 Ultimately,
Williams says, the equal treatment approach involves a commitment "to
uncover commonality rather than difference.
288
Williams situates this approach to pregnancy in a larger framework
of gender analysis. The law should not use gender as a proxy for other
characteristics; instead, it should treat individuals as individuals. 289 By
using sex as a proxy, traditional gender discrimination sought to perpet-
uate a system of gender roles in which a husband was the primary
breadwinner and a wife was the homemaker.29 The goal is to "break
down the legal barriers that restricted each sex to its predefined role and
created a hierarchy based on gender."'29' In place of this system of gender
roles, the equal treatment approach seeks to create a world in which
individuals and families may order "their lives in a way that best meets
their economic and personal needs." 292 Ultimately, the approach seeks to
(cpromote an integrated-and androgynous-prototype" of a worker.293
By stressing the comparability of pregnancy to other conditions rather
than its uniqueness, the equal treatment approach to pregnancy helps to
promote this androgynous model worker, free of gender roles and free to
define him/herself according to his/her own inclinations.294
Williams avoids both of the extreme forms of malebashing that we
have described. Liberal feminism directly rejects the notion that men are
inherently beasts. In its desire for an androgynous world and its belief in
a universal human nature, Williams' liberal feminism posits that men and
women are fundamentally the same. Men and women may have different
biology, but biology does not affect the capacity for rationality, which is
the hallmark of human agency. Men and women are socialized different-
ly, but those social roles are not destiny. Indeed, the basic purpose of
liberal feminism is to free individuals from gender role condition-
ing-through persuasion, consciousness-raising, political action, and the
like. In short, neither men nor women are inescapably anything, but are
rational, choosing beings.
287. Williams, supra note 284, at 326.
288. Williams, supra note 284, at 326.
289. See Williams, supra note 284, at 329-30.
290. See Williams, supra note 284, at 329-30, 352-55.
291. Williams, supra note 284, at 331.
292. Williams, supra note 284, at 354-55.
293. Williams, supra note 284, at 363. See also Williams, supra note 284, at 369.
294. See Williams, supra note 284, at 363, 369.
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Liberal feminism is also consistent with a rejection of the idea that
men are engaged in a universal and self-conscious conspiracy to oppress
women as a class. Individual men do oppress individual women and
contribute to the maintenance of a system of patriarchy. They do so,
however, as a result of socialization into an oppressive gender identity,
not as a result of a calculating desire to promote the interests of men as
a class.295 Moreover, the socialization itself is not a product of conscious
conspiracy: individual men do not make an autonomous choice to be
socialized into a particular gender role ab initio. 96
Not surprisingly, therefore, it is very hard these days to find an
accusation of malebashing directed at liberal feminists.2 97 The targets of
most accusations fall into the next two categories we consider.
B. Difference Feminism
The second category of feminist theory is often called difference
feminism. Unlike liberal feminists, who focus on commonality, difference
feminists emphasize the ways in which men and women have systemati-
295. Women are in essentially the same situation. They too are socialized into gender
roles, and many internalize the sexism inherent in those roles. See JAGGAR, FEMINIST
PoLiTIcs, supra note 280, at 37, 193-94. The liberal emphasis on individual
autonomy does, of course, leave open the possibility that one might blame individual
men (or women) for failing to reject that socialization once they are given an
adequate opportunity for enlightenment. See Calhoun, supra note 140, at 389 ("Thus
questions about moral responsibility become very difficult questions about how to
weigh the social determinants producing moral ignorance against the individual's
competence to engage in moral reasoning."). Such blame would, however, be an
individualized assessment of guilt in light of particular circumstances rather than a
wholesale condemnation of males generally. But c.f Calhoun, supra note 140, at 390
(arguing that we may be entitled to use moral reproach in "abnormal moral contexts
... independent of the blameworthiness of individuals").
296. See, e.g., CONNELL, GENDER AND POWER, supra note 139, at 49-50.
297. Davidson's attack on the principle of gender equality is one notable exception. See
Davidson, supra note 5, at 40-41. In general, liberal feminism is so far from
malebashing that it has proved immensely attractive to a particular segment in the
modern men's movement. These men argue, with liberal feminists, that gender roles
limit and oppress men as well as women. See, e.g., WARREN FARRELL, THE LIBERATED
MAN (1975); JACK NicHOLs, MEN'S LIBERATION (1975). Under the scheme of
separate spheres, women suffer, inter alia, from being confined to the home and
denied the fill use of their talents. Men suffer, inter alia, from having sole responsi-
bility for the support of a family, being sent off to war, and being forced to repress
a significant part of their emotional life. The destruction of such gender roles would
set all free.
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cally different experiences, activities, and even senses of self and reality.298
They point out that women's ways of experiencing, knowing, and
reasoning have largely been ignored or devalued by our dominant
culture.299 Their goal is to bring these differences to light and demand
that women's experiences, values, and activities be accorded social and
legal recognition.
Difference feminists adopt a broad range of positions on the
question of the source of these gender differences. Some believe gender
differences are a matter of socialization to gender roles under the condi-
tions of a sexist society. 00 Others suggest that certain activities, like
mothering, may give rise to particular characteristics in those who
habitually perform them.31 The sexual division of labor then leads to
systematic differences between men and women.3 0 2 Finally, some appear
to see a role for biology, particularly women's capacity to carry a fetus,
give birth, and breast-feed, in contributing to the different senses of self
and relation that men and women experience.
303
We will examine the work of Robin West as an example of differ-
ence feminism in legal theory. In The Difference in Women's Hedonic
Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory,3°4 West
provides an unusually clear and complete picture of the difference
approach. She argues that the legal system has largely ignored or
trivialized women's gender-specific suffering (e.g., sexual harassment,
domestic violence, rape).30 5 Moreover, feminist legal theory, which has
traditionally taken the form of either liberal feminism or radical femi-
nism, has also failed to seriously examine and incorporate women's
experiences of pleasure and pain.306 She suggests that a focus on the way
in which women's "hedonic lives" are different from men's might
provide a better explanation than either liberal or radical feminism for
298. See, e.g., West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 93-94.
299. See, e.g., BELENKY ET AL., supra note 49, at 4-6; GILLIGAN, supra note 49, at 1-4.
300. See, e.g., EVELYN Fox KELLER, REFLECTIONS ON GENDER AND SCIENCE 70, 88-89
(1985); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia Redux, 2 VA. J. Soc. Pon'y & L 75, 83
(identifying biological essentialism, socialization, and oppression as possible causes of
gender difference and asserting: "I do cast my vote in favor of a claim that difference
is socially derived ... ).
301. See, e.g., SARA RuDDICK, MATERNAL THINIUNG (1983).
302. See RuDDICK, supra note 301.
303. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 20-21.
304. West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132.
305. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 81-82.
306. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 83-84, 86-88.
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why the legal system dismisses women's suffering: women's pain is
ignored because it is not understood by men; it is not understood by
them because it is different from the pain that they experience. 30 7
West then proceeds to provide a detailed account of how the
conceptions of self at the root of liberal and radical feminism are not in
accord with the actual pleasures and pains that women feel.308 For liberal
feminism, the central issue for the self is autonomy; people choose what
will satisfy their own preferences and desires. Consent is, therefore, seen
as the primary vehicle for expressing autonomy. 30 9 West argues that many
women, however, define themselves as "giving selves," who consent in
order to satisfy the desires of others, even at the cost of substantial pain
to themselves.3 10 Women become giving selves (at least in part) in order
to defuse the experience of fear and danger that arises from the "acquisi-
tive and potentially violent nature of male sexuality":3" I do not need to
feel violated if I freely give to you what you are trying to take from
me.312 Equating consent and autonomy with happiness, then, fails to
grasp the real experience of much of women's pain.
For radical feminism, according to West, the central issue is power
and inequality.3 13 Radical feminism assumes people will be happier in a
state of equality, so the major agenda is to shift power from men to
women. 3 4 West points out that this equation of equality and happiness,
submission and misery, while true for much of women's lives, is contra-
dicted by many women's experience of pleasure in sexual submission.3 1 5
She argues that one can understand the attraction of sexual submission
as an expression of trust in the person to whom one gives up control.31
In failing to take seriously the potential pleasures of inequality, radical
feminism falsifies the experience of women.
West's work avoids the pitfall of the male conspiracy theory. While
she does suggest that the liberal focus on autonomy better fits men's
307. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 85.
308. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 87.
309. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 91-92.
310. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 92-93.
311. West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 94.
312. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 96-97.
313. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 113.
314. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 111-14.
315. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 116-17.
316. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 129-32.
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experience than women's, 317 she explicitly rejects the idea that patriarchy
is simply a matter of men consciously exercising that autonomy to
oppress women. She associates this idea with radical feminist legal
theory318 and argues that her own difference approach would suggest an
alternative cause for certain aspects of patriarchy. It is men's inability to
understand women's gender-specific suffering that has caused them to
ignore and trivialize it. 19 This inability arises not from some conscious
choice to subordinate women, but from the simple fact that men's
experience does not include these types of suffering and that women
have, by and large, been unwilling (or unable) to talk about their
experiences with men.120 Individual men can and do consciously oppress
women, but the system of patriarchy is much more the cause of indi-
vidual choices and preferences (as in the creation of women as giving
selves) than the product of conscious individual choice.
The greater risk for difference feminism is that it might fall into the
men-as-beasts trap. Perhaps the place where West comes closest to the
men-as-beasts position is in her article, Jurisprudence and Gender.321 We
briefly describe this article and then explain why it escapes our definition
of malebashing.
In Jurisprudence and Gender, West describes the difference between
traditional male jurisprudence and feminist jurisprudence.3 12 She divides
traditional male jurisprudence into liberal legal theory and critical legal
theory, and she argues that both are founded on the "separation thesis"-
the claim that human beings are fundamentally separate from each
other.3 23 This thesis gives rise to the hopes and fears of both of these
approaches to law.3 24 For liberals, the hope is for individual autonomy
and the fear is of annihilation of the individual by the group. For critical
legal theorists, the hope is to bridge separation through connection and
the fear is of failing to do so and remaining isolated and alienated.325
317. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 1, 5 (The separation thesis that
characterizes both liberal and critical legal theories "constitutes a legitimate and true
part of the total subjective experience of masculinity.").
318. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 84.
319. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 85.
320. See West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132, at 96.
321. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50.
322. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50.
323. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 1.
324. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50.
325. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 13.
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Feminist legal theory, on the other hand, rests on a "connection
thesis": "[w]omen are actually or potentially materially connected to
other human life."326 This connection arises, in West's view, from a
combination of cultural and material forces, including the biological fact
that women carry and give birth to children, as well as the social fact
that women generally raise children.2 7 The connection thesis generates
a parallel but very different set of hopes and fears for feminist theory.2
For cultural (or difference) feminists, the hope is for intimacy and the
fear is of separation when intimacy fails. For radical feminists, the fear
is of connection that takes the form of invasion or intrusion and the
hope is for sufficient individual integrity to resist or prevent such
invasion.32
9
This Article, then, develops a schema in which men (but not
women) seem doomed to vacillate between the valorization and denigra-
tion of their fundamental separateness, but are never able to overcome
it. In light of West's clear endorsement of connection as a fundamental
moral imperative,330 this argument could be read as an example of the
men-as-beasts type of malebashing. We would like to suggest an alterna-
tive reading that shows how even a difference feminism that relies to
some extent on biology can avoid the complete loss of agency that
characterizes the men-as-beasts type of malebashing.
First, to the extent that West relies on social conditioning (rather
than biology) to explain gender differences, it seems clear that she does
not see either women or men as trapped within a particular gender
model. In the aggregate, men can, of course, change because the social
roles themselves can change. If, for example, more men took full re-
sponsibility for child-rearing, they would find themselves experiencing a
more connected sense of self. In addition, any particular man has at least
some capacity for change through new experiences and self-reflection,
just as women have come to recognize and reject damaging aspects of
femininity through consciousness-raising. Indeed, West's call, in her
Hedonic Lives article, for women to speak up to men about their differ-
ent experiences makes sense only if men can listen and change in
response to what they hear.3 31
326. West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 14.
327. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 14.
328. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 37.
329. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 36.
330. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 18.
331. West, Hedonic Lives, supra note 132. Indeed, one of the major distinctions between
a culturally based difference feminism and liberal feminism is that the difference
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Adding reproductive biology as part of the foundation for the
difference between women and men,332 also does not force West to the
men-as-beasts pole of the agency continuum. She is quite clear that
biology is not destiny.33 3 Women may have an easier time adopting a
connected point of view, for example, because of their experience of
pregnancy, but men could learn to become more connected.334 Men, like
women, have had the experience of being cared for as an infant, and that
may be the central experience for forming and valuing connection.
3 3 5
Indeed, one of the most important aspects of difference feminism is its
claim that traditionally female activities and attitudes of caring must be
morally valued for all people, men as well as women.336 If men were
trapped by their biology in a morass of beastliness, making such a moral
claim on them would be utterly futile.
Therefore, West's reliance on biology and culture does not commit
her to some completely deterministic approach to agency for either men
or women. She plainly believes that gender roles and gender relations can
be consciously transformed by individuals, even if those roles rest in part
on biological realities that are unlikely to change any time soon.337 It is
precisely the hope of such transformation that is the moving force
behind her work. Thus, difference feminism is consistent with a rejection
of both forms of polar malebashing that we have identified.
C. Dominance Feminism
The third type of feminist theory is "dominance theory."338 This
approach argues that the real issue for feminists is neither sameness (as
liberal feminists suggest) nor difference (as difference feminists suggest),
feminist would argue that some aspects of the socially constructed female gender role
are valuable and should be maintained.
332. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 21-27.
333. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 71 ("[B]iology is destiny only
to the extent of our ignorance.").
334. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 24, 71 ("Men can connect to
other human life. Men can nurture life. Men can mother.").
335. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 25.
336. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 18.
337. See West, Jurisprudence and Gender, supra note 50, at 46-48, 57-58, 70-71.
338. See, e.g., Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. Rnv. 304 (1995). This type of theory is also sometimes called
radical feminism.
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but power: who dominates whom.339 Domination and subordination
have been so tied to gender that they have become part of the meaning
of (hetero)sexuality itself.340 The purpose of feminist legal theory is to
unmask this domination in its legal guises and to devise legal strategies
for shifting power from men to women.
The best known proponent of dominance feminism in legal theory
is Catharine MacKinnon. Her controversial work on the issue of por-
nography provides a powerful example of the dominance approach.
Pornography, according to MacKinnon, is "a form of forced sex, a
practice of sexual politics, an institution of gender inequality....
[P]ornography institutionalizes the sexuality of male supremacy .... "341
The portrayal of women in pornography as things to be used by men,
either with or without overt violence, creates the meaning of sexuality
and gender for both men and women.342 According to MacKinnon, "to
the extent pornography succeeds in constructing social reality, it becomes
invisible as harm."'33 The first task of feminists is to make visible this
harm.
The second task for feminists in law is to find legal mechanisms to
attack this power imbalance and resist male dominance. MacKinnon,
along with Andrea Dworkin and others, drafted a local ordinance to
provide such mechanisms to women injured by pornography. 344 The
ordinance defined pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit subordi-
nation of women through pictures or words."3 5 The ordinance created
339. See MAcKINNON, Difrence and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 32, 32-45.
340. See DWORKIN, supra note 53, at 63. Indeed, this model is so pervasive that it may
cast a shadow even over many sexual relationships between people of the same
gender. See MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 60, at
141-42.
341. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 146,
148.
342. See MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at
146, 148-49.
343. MAcKNNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 163, 174.
344. The ordinance was considered in Minneapolis and different versions were adopted
in Indianapolis and Bellingham, Washington. STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JEssE H.
CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES-COMMENTS--QESTIONS 181 n.a (2d ed.
1996). It was passed in Indianapolis and found to violate the free speech clause of
the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by the federal courts. See American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985).
345. MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
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causes of action: for those who were coerced into performing for the
production of pornography; for those who were coerced into exposure to
pornography; for those who were assaulted due to pornography; and for
anyone who wanted to prevent trafficking in the materials defined 46
This effort to control pornography generated enormous controversy,
not only between feminists and First Amendment theorists, but among
feminist legal theorists themselves. 47 We would like to sidestep this
entire controversy and focus instead on the implications of MacKinnon's
approach for the question of male agency. Does the dominance theory
require either of the extreme views of agency that we have identified as
malebashing?
MacKinnon is a favorite target of many of those making accusations
of malebashing 4 She often speaks and writes about men as a category,
leaving little room for the kind of diversity we mentioned earlier.
Moreover, dominance theory seems likely to deteriorate into a conspiracy
theory: if men have all the power, then they must be exercising it
intentionally to keep women subordinate. Women are always the victims,
men always the villains in this picture.
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 163, 176; American Booksellers Ass'n v.
Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. 1316, 1319 (S.D. Ind. 1984). The ordinance also required
that the portrayal include one of a list of factors found to create subordination. The
list includes women presented as:
(1)... sexual objects who enjoy pain or humiliation... (2) sexual objects
who experience pleasure in being raped (3) . .. sexual objects tied up or
cut up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt ... (4) ... being
penetrated by objects or animals ... (5) ... in scenarios of degradation,
injury, abasement, torture ... in a context that makes these conditions
sexual ... (6) ... sexual objects for domination, conquest, violation,
exploitation, possession, or use, or through postures or positions of servility
or submission or display.
Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1320 (quoting INDIANAPOLIS AND MARION CouNrrY, IND.,
CODE ch. 16 (1984)).
346. See Hudnut, 598 F. Supp. at 1321-22.
347. See, e.g., NADINE STROSSEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY. FREE SPEECH, SEX, AND THE
FIGHT oR WOMEN'S RIGHTS (1995); Steven G. Gey, The Apologetics of Suppression:
The Regulation ofPornography as Act and Idea, 86 MICH. L. Rav. 1564 (1988); Frank
I. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in American Constitutional Argument: The
Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REv. 291 (1989); Nadine Strossen, A
Feminist Critique of "the" Feminist Critique of Pornography, 79 VA. L. REv. 1099
(1993).
348. See, e.g., Morrow, supra note 69, at 58 (Dworkin and MacKinnon are "the Al
Sharpton and Louis Farrakhan of feminism, extremists who are convenient targets for
antifeminists.").
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I MacKinnon's view of agency however, is more complex and
ambiguous than this caricature would suggest. First, she does not fall
prey to the conspiracy theory. While some men may be conscious that
the pleasure they find in pornography is a result of the eroticization of
dominance, MacKinnon is extremely clear that this is not the situation
for most men. In her view, the existence of pornography shapes the way
men understand gender so that they come to see hierarchy as equality. As
she puts it, "This is equality for [women]."'349 Men do not consciously
conspire to subordinate women. Rather, they are incapable of seeing that
the conditions under which most women live, like the prevalence of
pornography, are subordinating. In order for a conspiracy to exist, men
would generally have to realize that domination was the result of certain
practices and choose to pursue gender hierarchy as their goal 5 In
MacKinnon's view, such a realization is .extremely unlikely because
pornography shapes men's (and women's) understandings of gender and
sex.
35
'
Indeed, it is far more plausible to interpret MacKinnon as falling at
the men-as-beasts pole of the agency continuum than at the conspiracy
theory end. The conspiracy theory relies on a model of individual
autonomy that MacKinnon has consistently criticized." 2 But her "thor-
oughgoing social constructivism"353 (e.g., the claim that social construc-
tions, such as the eroticization of dominance, simply are reality) could
lead her to adopt the position that men are beasts by culture. They are
inevitably and inescapably formed by these cultural forces. Indeed, this
349. MAcKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 163, 171.
350. Men may, of course, intentionally choose to maintain gender relations as they
understand them, but they do not generally (at least consciously) understand them
as based on domination and submission. MacKinnon says that "[allthough these
actions [that keep women in their place] may in some real way be unintentional, they
are taken, in some other real way, as meant." MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY o1'
THE STATE, supra note 60, at 94. In other words, even in the absence of a conspiracy,
men can act on an underlying commitment to the existing power arrangement.
351. See MACKINNON, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 163, 171-74.
352. See, e.g., MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE, supra note 60, at 94-95.
353. Abrams, supra note 338, at 326.
354. It is an outrageous misreading of MacKinnon to suggest, as some have, that she sees
men as beasts by biology. See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 22, at 12-13 (claiming that
radical feminists, of whom MacKinnon is his prime example, see differences between
men and women as biological). MacKinnon is very clear about her belief that
sexuality is socially constructed down "to the ground": that is, there is no presocial,
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interpretation of her work is strengthened by the fact that other feminists
have criticized dominance theory generally, and MacKinnon in particular,
for denigrating women's agency by ascribing this deterministic cultural
conditioning to them as well. Here too, however, we believe that a
careful reading of her work suggests that MacKinnon can and does reject
this simplistic view of agency, for men as well as women.
Kathryn Abrams, in a recent article entitled Sex Wars Redux: Agency
and Coercion in Feminist Legal Theory,355 provides a comprehensive
account of this critique of dominance theory's perceived determinism
from within feminist ranks. As Abrams points out, the impression of
deterministic cultural conditioning arises more from the implications of
MacKinnon's vork than from any explicit endorsement by her.356
MacKinnon emphasizes "the systematic character of women's constraint,
[and] the way that choices subjectively experienced as free may reflect
women's collusion in their own subordination. "351 She consistently
ignores the ways in which women might exercise their agency to resist
this subordination.
MacKinnon does not, however, reject the possibility of resistance.
Indeed, she occasionally explicitly acknowledges its existence. For exam-
ple, she believes that through consciousness-raising women may not only
recognize but resist the sexual domination in their lives.358 In addition,
she plainly recognizes that certain feminist activists have exercised their
agency to resist domination.3 19 Nonetheless, she consistently refuses to
discuss the ways in which agency and resistance can survive cultural
constructionism. If she is not endorsing a completely determinist view of
women's agency, then why does she so systematically focus on cultural
determinism rather than individual resistance?
Abrams hypothesizes that this focus may have served the strategic
purpose of closing off the predictable "present company excepted"
natural gender identity or sexuality for men or women; gender and sexuality are
defined and created by social forces. MACKINNON, Not a Moral Issue, in FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 146, 149; MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY OF THE
STATE, supra note 60, at 90-91.
355. Abrams, supra note 338.
356. See Abrams, supra note 338, at 329.
357. Abrams, supra note 338, at 326-27.
358. See Abrams, supra note 338, at 327 n.83 (citing MacKinnon on consciousness-
raising).
359. See Abrams, supra note 338, at 328 n.84 (discussing MacKinnon's acknowledgement
of the agency of Andrea Dworkin and Linda Marchiano in resisting domination).
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response of many women to the dominance thesis." Many women
would be prepared to believe that others are trapped by the cultural
construction of gender, but that they themselves are not.361 Refusing to
discuss the ways in which agency survives social constructionism may
help force women to face the reality of coercion and subordination in
their own lives.
Abrams' interpretation of MacKinnon on women's agency is equally
applicable to men's agency. As with women, MacKinnon's language is
severely slanted toward emphasizing the social construction of men's
sexuality and gender identity. She rarely discusses the possibility that men
might resist this conditioning or the mechanisms through which they
might develop that resistance. Nonetheless, she does not assert that
resistance is impossible and she actually (although rarely) acknowledges
examples of such resistance.
For instance, MacKinnon quotes with obvious approval from a
young man who testified about his efforts to "repudiate the thrill of
dominance."362 He explains that "if women in a society filled by por-
nography must be wary for their physical selves, a man, even a man of
good intentions, must be wary for his mind .... J]ust as a well-meaning
German was afraid in 1933, I am also very much afraid."363 This man
has proven able, not only to recognize the evil inherent in gender
conditioning (as evidenced by his analogy to Nazism), but also to make
efforts to resist it in himself. He (and we) may never escape our sexist
culture entirely, but he is also not completely determined by it.
If MacKinnon does recognize the possibility of male resistance to
patriarchy, then why does she usually ignore it in favor of the type of
generalizations about men that lead to accusations of malebashing? We
believe that she does so for the same reason that Abrams suggests she
ignores women's agency: to close the escape hatch that her audience
would be all too likely to use to avoid the dominance critique. Men, like
women, will want to exempt themselves: "Sure gender roles are oppres-
sive to many people, but I have managed to resist them: I am not
360. See Abrams, supra note 338, at 329.
361. See Abrams, supra note 338, at 328 n.84; see also Frances Olsen, Feminist Theory in
Grand Style, 89 CoLuM. L. Rav. 1147 (1989).
362. MACKMNNoN, Francis Biddle's Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 163, 189 (MacKinnon's description rather
than the man's own).
363. MACINNON, Francis Biddle' Sister: Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, in
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note 53, at 163, 189-90.
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dominating anybody." By emphasizing how we are captured and
downplaying how we can resist, MacKinnon hopes to remove this escape
option and force self-scrutiny. One can criticize this approach as either
ineffective or not worth the price, but such a strategic choice is com-
pletely consistent with a belief that men are not culturally destined to be
beasts. Thus, dominance feminism, as exemplified by Catharine
MacKinnon, does not require either of the two extreme positions we
have identified as malebashing
3 64
D. Postmodernist Feminism
The last type of feminist theory current in present legal literature is
postmodernist feminism. Perhaps the best known legal scholar to espouse
an explicitly postmodernist feminism was the late Mary Joe Frug. We
will rely on her work to represent this category of theorists.
Although postmodernism resists characterization, it is possible to
identify certain themes or orientations that postmodern legal feminists
share. Frug suggested that one "principle" of postmodernism is that
human experience is located "inescapably within language."365 Power
(including legal power) is exercised not only through direct coercion, but
also through the way in which language (including legal language) shapes
and restricts our reality. This makes language a potentially fruitful site of
political struggle.
3 66
Frug's second postmodern principle is that gender is not something
natural, nor is it something completely determinate and definable. Like
all human systems of meaning, it is constantly evolving and capable of
infinite variations under individual circumstances. Gender is, therefore,
socially constructed and completely inescapable (what would it mean to
364. Our interpretation of MacKinnon suggests that she has chosen to use rhetoric that
comes much closer to polar malebashing than her actual position on agency requires.
This interpretation raises the question of how one should assess that choice of
rhetoric. If our guess as to her reasons for the choice is correct, then one would need
to consider whether the strategic value of such rhetoric (if any) is sufficient to
overcome the objections to it based on the feminist commitments and dialogic norms
we considered in the previous section. In our framework-in which polar
malebashing is an extremely narrow class of claims that are so fundamentally
illegitimate as to require no response-rhetoric that reaches that point should rarely
if ever be justified in an academic, dialogic forum. We do not mean to foreclose the
possibility, however, that a different assessment might be appropriate in some other
forum or under some extreme set of circumstances.
365. MARY JoE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 126 (1992).
366. See FRUG, supra note 365, at 126.
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be outside the system of meaning?), but always susceptible to a new
interpretation.3 67 Gender, like other systems of meaning, is less like a
cage, and more like a tool: it constrains but never completely determines
what one can do with it.
Frug applies these postmodern insights to analyze the way in which
legal language constructs the female body. She finds that legal rules and
discourse generate three related meanings for the female body. First, the
female body is a body that can be terrorized, and is consequently one
that has learned to submit. 6 Second, it is a body that is "'for' materni-
ty.''369 And third, it is a body that is "'for' sex with men," a body that is
sexually desirable and sexually vulnerable.3 7 1 She traces these three
meanings through the legal rules and practical realities regarding prosti-
tution, family and work, and monogamous heterosexuality.3 7' Her
argument is that even the aspects of gender that we consider most
biological (e.g., the capacity for sexual intercourse or for reproduction)
are completely permeated by culturally constructed meanings.37 2 What it
means that women carry fetuses, for example, has almost nothing to do
with the biology of their uteruses and everything to do with how our
society structures workplaces, sexual relationships, and family responsi-
bilities.
What this postmodernist position means for agency is one of the
most contested issues in feminist legal theory right now. Certainly
postmodernists in general, and Frug in particular, wish to decenter the
subject: to point out that an individual actor is less a coherent collection
of desires and beliefs and more a location where various cultural systems
intersect in unique ways. 73 Does such a view necessarily imply either of
the unacceptable poles we identified as malebashing?
As with MacKinnon, who shares some of the epistemological
assumptions of postmodernism, there is no real danger of Frug falling
into the conspiracy theory trap. Gender is constructed by systems of
social meaning in which men and women both participate. Individual
367. See FRUG, supra note 365, at 126.
368. See FRUG, supra note 365, at 129.
369. FRUG, supra note 365, at 129.
370. FRUG, supra note 365, at 130.
371. See FRUG, supra note 365, at 131-45.
372. See FRUG, supra note 365, at 128-29.
373. See, e.g., James Boyle, Is Subjectivity Possible? The Post-Modern Subject in Legal Theory,
62 U. COLO. L. Rav. 489 (1991); Pierre Schlag, The Problem of the Subject, 69 Tix.
L. Rav. 1627 (1991).
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men are formed by those systems. They do not generally consciously
conspire to maintain them. Rather, they see them as inevitable and
natural. The central point in the postmodernist approach is to demon-
strate the ways in which those systems of meaning are constructed rather
than simply given, as Frug has tried to do with the meaning of the
female body in law. If most men do not see the system of gender as
culturally chosen at all, then they can hardly be engaged in a conscious
conspiracy to maintain that cultural choice.
Similarly, the thoroughgoing cultural constructionism of the
postmodern point of view suggests that men cannot be beasts by bio-
logical nature. Nature, in the sense of some presocial gender identity,
simply does not exist in the postmodernist world. The real danger for
postmodernism is that it will so completely succeed in dissolving the self
that no individual agency will remain through which men (or women)
could resist the socially imposed meanings of gender.
Postmodernists avoid this complete social determinism by relying on
the insights of deconstructionism. They argue that systems of social
meaning are always inherently unstable; the ideas they are seeking to
suppress are constantly bubbling up to disrupt them." These ideas often
find entry through the mechanism of interpretation. Although we have
only the materials that our culture gives us, that culture is constantly
transformed by new interpretations. No repetition is ever exact; there are
subtle but important shifts in every reenactment of a cultural pattern,
including gender patterns.3 7 5 In the space created by interpretation, both
individual resistance and political reform become possible.
37 6
Many other feminists have found this reliance on interpretation to
be problematic. It appears not to take seriously enough the very real
oppression that women suffer: how does one reinterpret rape or spousal
abuse?377 It also is clearly related to the emphasis on "style" and the
sometimes flippant tone that characterizes much postmodernist writing
and that many feminists find disturbing.3 7' And, if socially constructed
systems of meaning are really so completely encompassing, it is not clear
374. See CORNELL, supra note 176, at 36-42.
375. See CORNELL, supra note 176, at 104-06.
376. See Judith Greenberg, Introduction to FRUG, supra note 365, at xxviii.
377. See CORNELL, supra note 176, at 82, 118; FRUG, supra note 365, at 127.
378. See FRUG, supra note 245, at 127. For an example of such criticism, see Mari J.
Matsuda, Pragmatism Modified and the False Consciousness Problem, 63 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1763, 1768-71 (1990).
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how, in the end, it is possible to generate a truly new interpretation.
Where does the new insight or vision come from? 3
79
Whatever its difficulties, however, the reliance on interpretation and
techniques of deconstruction is clearly a step away from complete
determinism and toward the possibility of individual and collective
resistance. If such reinterpretations are possible, then men cannot be
predestined by a violently sexist culture to be violent or sexist beasts.
Men, like women, have the capacity to find in that culture the seeds of
a new vision of gender which will allow them, however imperfectly, to
create a new interpretation of their own masculinity. They are not
inherently and inescapably beasts.
Thus, all four of the categories of feminist theory that are current
in the legal literature are consistent with a rejection of polar malebashing
as we have defined it. While it is possible for each type of theory to
embrace one or the other pole of the agency continuum, it is also
possible for each of them to reject both poles while remaining faithful to
the central insights of that theory. There are two important implications
that follow from this analysis. First, it is not true that malebashing is an
inherent or necessary part of feminism in general or any of these brands
of feminism in particular. It is quite possible, and we believe quite
common, to produce feminist theory without engaging in polar
malebashing. Second, the rejection of these extreme views of male agency
does not require feminists to eschew any particular theoretical approach.
The whole broad range of current theories remains open to feminists
who are committed to avoiding polar malebashing.
CONCLUSION
Although this Article addressed the role of a certain argumentative
structure (malebashing) within academic dialogue, we have a more than
academic interest in this subject. We recently became the parents of a
baby boy and suddenly found ourselves face-to-face with a collection of
issues we had never considered in quite the same way before. We face,
of course, all of the issues about how to raise a boy to have good atti-
tudes towards women in a deeply sexist society: how do we reduce or
counteract the messages about women that he will be bombarded with
379. See Susan H. Williams, Review Essay: Utopianism, Epistemology, and Feminist Theory,
5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 289, 307-11 (reviewing CORNELL, supra note 176).
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throughout his childhood? But there are also questions about how to
raise him to have good attitudes towards men, including himself.
We find that while the first set of questions presents very difficult
practical problems-e.g., which techniques (avoidance, confrontation,
example) are most effective?-the goal itself is relatively clear. We may
not know what gender attitudes would be in a perfectly just society, but
we do have some idea in which direction lie the first steps from here to
there.
The second set of questions, however, causes us more confusion. It
is not just difficult to know how to instill the appropriate attitudes, it is
difficult to know what they are. What are the right attitudes towards
men in a violently sexist culture in which they dominate? What if you
are a man yourself?
We both think of ourselves as feminists, and it is very important to
us that our son someday see himself the same way. But we recognize that
it is inevitable (and maybe a good thing?) that he will also someday see
himself as a man. It is crucial that he find a positive way to hold both
of these self-images, indeed, that he find a way to make them mutually
supporting. We do not want a commitment to feminism to mean that
he either has to hate himself (because he is one of those evil male
creatures) or renounce his masculinity (in order not to be one of those
evil creatures). The two images we used to illustrate malebashing
throughout this article-the conspiracy theory and the men-as-beasts
theory-create precisely this dilemma.
We do not mean to suggest that it is the job of feminists to make
men feel good about themselves. Indeed, it may well be part of the job
of feminists to make many men feel bad about themselves. 3 0 But it
cannot be the case that accepting feminism necessarily blocks any
possibility of feeling good about yourself or about being male. There
must be room within feminism for some reconceptualization of mascu-
linity that can be both meaningful to actual men in our society and
acceptable from a feminist point of view.
This concern has a very pragmatic, or strategic, side as well. It is not
just little boys for whom conceptions of masculinity are an issue. Many
grown men are also struggling to find a way to bring together their
380. Indeed, the subtle and uncomfortable sense of complicity many men feel when they
examine their own behavior and assumptions from a feminist standpoint is an
important engine for social change. Creating that discomfort is undoubtedly one of
the primary tasks of feminism. We are simply suggesting that feminism cannot
require that men never find any comfortable conception of masculinity.
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feminist commitments and their inability (or unwillingness) to abandon
their own gender identities. A good friend of ours, who is male and very
much committed to feminism, once complained about the way he was
treated in feminist gatherings where he was the only man. The women
would criticize men in the broadest possible terms and then smile at him
and say, "present company excepted, of course." They meant to be
telling him that they regarded him as having escaped the gender roles
they were objecting to, but the implied shadow message was that he was
not a "man" as they understood and used that term. He felt that he was
being asked to renounce his membership in his gender as the price of
admission to these discussions.
If feminists want more men to join our ranks, we need to present
them with a view of men that allows them to embrace feminism without
hating the gender to which, given the present reality of our culture, they
are inevitably connected. Many feminists are presently engaged in
projects to reconceptualize, problematize, and multiply the images of
"woman." We must be open to similar strategies with respect to mascu-
linity and "man." This cannot, and need not, disable us from criticizing
particular images of masculinity that have been dominant in our culture.
But we must leave room for, indeed actively encourage, alternatives to
those images, alternatives that make the conjunction "feminist men"
more like a tautology and less like an oxymoron.
Although this project of reconceptualizing masculinity probably
needs to begin with men, it is crucial that feminist women be involved.
Men and women are both extremely prone to replicate the damaging
aspects of traditional gender identities in this search for a
reconceptualization of their own gender."' But feminist women can
provide a useful warning to men when the "new" masculinity they are
designing feels oppressive to women in much the same way as the old
one." 2 If the goals of feminism include dismantling the hierarchical
gender structure, reducing the violence and repression in women's lives,
and increasing women's opportunities in society, then reconceptualizing
masculinity is a powerful tool that feminists cannot afford to ignore.
381. This is, of course, the difficulty with the present men's movement's attempt to
revitalize masculinity: it is much more an effort to revive existing (and, from women's
perspectives, oppressive) conceptions than to design new ones.
382. When women replicate damaging aspects of traditional femininity, however, they
most often harm themselves rather than men. Men cannot therefore warn women
when women's search for new gender images replicates the old oppression.
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This Article has not attempted this project of reconceptualizing
masculinity. Our goal has merely been to clear the ground so that this
work could proceed. Polar malebashing, as we have defined it, is a way
of characterizing men that prevents this project of reconceptualization
from ever getting started. If what it means to be a man is that you are
consciously committed to dominating women or you are an inherently
sexist beast, then there is no room for feminist men. More precisely, the
project of reconceptualizing gender identities presupposes that we do not
occupy either pole of the agency continuum we have discussed. If we
were all perfectly autonomous choosers, a gender identity would have no
special power over us. It would simply be one hat we could put on or
take off at will. To recognize the importance of conceptions of gender
is to recognize the reality and importance of social construction of the
self. On the other hand, if we were all completely determined by biology
or social conditioning to be whatever our gender required, then we
would have no capacity as individuals to reconceptualize or reform our
gender identities. We must retain sufficient agency to reflect on our own
conditioning and envision alternatives to it.
The project we are describing here, in other words, is one that is
useful only if we avoid the extreme autonomy end of the continuum and
possible only if we avoid the extreme determinism end of the continuum.
By defining malebashing in terms of these positions on agency, we have
ruled out of bounds only those criticisms of men that stand as a barrier
to the work of reenvisioning masculinity. And we have left open a broad
range of feminist theories on which we might draw in this effort.
Thus, even if it turns out that feminists do not often engage in
polar malebashing as we have defined it, it is an important conceptual
category for us to keep in mind. Realizing why these images of men are
so illegitimate as to warrant the epithet "malebashing" allows us to see
how we can, and must, participate in the work of constructing livable,
and feminist, visions of men. So that, perhaps, when our son is a little
older, we will be able to offer him a way (or, better yet, several different
ways) to be both a committed feminist and a happy man.
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